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The purpose of this dissertation is to propose and estimate count data microeconometric models
that take into account special features of health care data. Three problems in health economics are
investigated. The first essay analyzes the effect of managed care insurance plans on the demand for
outpatient physician visits. It provides a Bayesian method to empirically separate selection effects
due to individual choice of coverage and incentive effects known as moral hazard. The proposed
Endogenous Hurdle Poisson log-Normal model addresses two important econometric issues: the
large proportion of zero outpatient visits and the endogeneity of managed care insurance status
to utilization of outpatient services. The data are obtained from the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey, (MEPS), and the sample consists of privately insured individuals, aged 21-64, all of whom
are employed but not self-employed. The analysis indicates both favorable selection bias and
important moral hazard effects in the decision whether to utilize an outpatient visit or not. The
second essay investigates the impact of health insurance coverage on utilization of doctor visits.
A Bayesian panel count data model with correlated random effects and endogenous treatment
of the insurance variable is applied to a subset of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a
national longitudinal survey of individuals over 50 years old and their spouses. The age limit for
Medicare eligibility at age 65 serves as an exclusion restriction. After controlling for selection effects
insured individuals present higher utilization of doctor visits. The third essay analyzes the demand
for cigarettes using data from the 1994-1996 Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by Individuals
(CSFII). Since individuals tend to round their consumption of cigarettes in packs smoked per day
the dependent variable - number of cigarettes - exhibits pile-ups of counts. The mixed binary-
ordered probit approach accommodates this feature of the data and models the starting smoking,
the quitting smoking and the how much to smoke decisions. The analysis is performed separately
for men and women and provides strong evidence of gender differences in cigarette consumption.
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Preface
This dissertation consists of three self-contained essays concerned with microeconometric models
with a dependent variable in the form of a count, understood as the number of times an event
occurs. Count data models have become particularly popular in health economics applications
because of their ability to model health care utilization (such as the number of physician visits or
the number of prescriptions dispensed over a given year) as well as other discrete aspects of health
behavior such as cigarettes and alcohol consumption over a time interval.
The literature on count data models is extensive and develops from the Poisson Regression
Model (PRM) — the starting point for count data analysis — to more sophisticated models that
address the limitations of the PRM and take into account special features of the data. The present
dissertation contributes to this literature by investigating three problems in health economics which
involve non-standard count data modeling and estimation techniques.
The empirical methodology applied in the first two chapters yields a number of insights into
the way utilization of health care services is modeled. Both essays focus on the impact of health
insurance status on the count of medical services. The insurance status is a binary choice between
managed care plans and fee for service plans in the first essay and between insurance coverage and
no coverage in the second essay. In studies with observational data observed differences in utilization
rates between the two insurance states may be partly due to selection bias. Insured individuals
may have different characteristics than the uninsured and similarly those in managed care plans
may differ from those covered by fee-for-service plans. While selection on observed characteristics
is controlled for by including rich sets of explanatory variables in the model specification there
may still be selection on unmeasured or unmeasurable factors. The model accounts for selection
on unobservables by endogenizing the binary insurance variable such that unobserved factors that
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affect the insurance decision may also affect utilization of medical services. It is shown that the
addition of this feature in the models has important policy implications since it allows separation
of the two forces that are responsible for observing different utilization rates between insurance
states: the incentive effects, known as moral hazard, and the selection effects.
The first essay analyzes the effect of managed care insurance plans on the demand for outpatient
care. The dependent variable, outpatient physician visits, is a count variable that displays a large
proportion of zeros. Two part models for count data, known as hurdle models, accommodate
such a high percentage of zeros by assuming two different data generating processes for zeroes
and positive counts. The proposed model extends the hurdle model to account for endogeneity of
the insurance status to outpatient care utilization. The model is applied to a sample of privately
insured individuals, 21-64 years old, obtained from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS).
The second essay is methodologically and thematically related to the first essay. The setting
is similar in that the dependent variable is a count and the explanatory variable of interest is
an endogenously determined binary choice variable. The distinctive feature is that endogeneity
is modeled in a panel framework. The proposed panel count data model with correlated random
effects and explicit treatment of endogeneity is applied to investigate the impact of health insurance
coverage on utilization of doctor visits. The data are compiled from the Health and Retirement
Survey (HRS), a national longitudinal survey of individuals aged over 50 and their spouses. Es-
timation of the model indicates favorable selection bias on unobservables and positive incentive
effects: insured individuals utilize more doctor visits than the uninsured. If selectivity were not
explicitly modeled the estimate of insurance would compound selection and incentive effects lead-
ing to misleading estimates. This is particularly relevant to the current debate about the benefits
and costs of nearly universal health care coverage. Policymakers are interested in predicting the
amount of overcrowding in primary care physician offices resulting from offering insurance coverage
to the currently uninsured. The model can also serve as an empirical tool to predict the impact of
universal coverage on other measures of medical and Rx utilization.
Both essays adopt Bayesian and parametric estimation methods. Bayesian econometrics focus
on the posterior density which combines prior beliefs about the parameters and information from the
data embodied in the likelihood. Numerical summaries such as the posterior mean and variance
vii
are calculated in order to present the information contained in the posterior distribution. The
intractable analytic expressions of the posterior distributions motivate the use of Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods.
The third essay analyzes the demand for cigarettes fitting observed zero outcomes with a trivari-
ate model consisting of an equation for the starting smoking decision, an equation for the quitting
decision, and an equation that models the level of cigarettes consumed. As opposed to the first
two essays the model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood. Data are compiled from the 1994-1996
Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by Individuals (CSFII) and exhibit an interesting pattern: the
histogram of the number of cigarettes smoked per day has spikes at multiples of 5 cigarettes possi-
bly because individuals round their consumption of cigarettes to half pack, one pack, 2 packs and
so forth. This feature of the data set motivates the use of an ordered probit model for the level of
consumption which provides the best fit among five competing specifications.
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Chapter 1
Bayesian Estimation of an
Endogenous Hurdle Model: an
Application to the Demand for
Outpatient Care
1.1 Introduction
This chapter develops a model to analyze the effect of an endogenously determined binary choice
variable on a count variable. Specifically, the model is applied to analyze the effect of managed
care relative to the standard indemnity insurance on outpatient physician visits for the privately
insured US population.
Endogeneity of insurance is a major concern for researchers that analyze the effects of managed
care on utilization. When data are non-experimental, individuals are not randomly assigned to
different insurance plans. Instead they self-select themselves into one of the plans based on many
factors, some of which can be controlled for by employing a rich set of explanatory variables. For
example, several studies have documented that health maintenance organization (HMO) popula-
tions are younger. Other studies have found that HMOs are likely to attract a larger proportion
of new migrants, families who expect to utilize maternity care, and individuals who expect to use
a high level of outpatient services. However, some of the factors that influence the choice of insur-
ance, such as risk preferences, are unobservable. Since the same risk preferences are likely to affect
utilization, endogeneity is generated by the omission of the relevant unobservables and statistical
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control for it is necessary.
The dependent variable of interest, outpatient physician visits, is a count variable that displays
a large proportion of zeros (more than 80 percent). This motivates the use of a two-part model
for count data, often referred to as a hurdle model. Hurdle models have become popular in the
literature on the demand for health care because they serve two purposes. First, they can fit
patterns with high incidences of zero medical care usage, which are often observed in real data.
Second, they can be given a structural interpretation that is consistent with a two part decision
making process. At the first stage, the patient decides independently whether to visit a doctor at
all. At the second stage, the physician decides the intensity of treatment. This stage is sometimes
referred to as the frequency decision. An appropriate modeling would require the contact decision
and the frequency decision treated as different stochastic processes. In the hurdle model this is
achieved by assuming two different data generating processes for the zero and positive counts.
Various specifications for the two parts have been proposed (Mullahy, 1986; Pohlmeier and Ulrich,
1994; Gurmu, 1998; Winkelmann, 2004). A semiparametric estimation method of the hurdle model
has also been suggested by Gurmu (1997).
The essay contributes to the literature on hurdle models by proposing a Bayesian estimation
procedure based on Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods and extending the hurdle model
to account for endogeneity of a binary treatment variable. The MCMC algorithm builds on the
recent advances made by Tanner and Wong (1987), Albert and Chib (1993), Chib et al. (1998), Li
(1998), Chib and Hamilton (2000), Munkin and Trivedi (2003), and Deb et al. (2006b). The model
is applied to a sample obtained from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and covers
the period 1997-2002. We combine all managed care plans into one managed care category. The
remaining privately insured individuals have a standard indemnity plan coverage. We perform hy-
pothesis testing of endogeneity calculating Bayes factors using the Savage-Dickey density approach.
We also calculate various average treatment effects based on the estimated posterior distributions
of the parameters.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 provides a brief background on
managed care and reviews the literature of selection models on health care utilization. Section
1.3 discusses hurdle models and their contribution to health literature. Section 1.4 specifies the
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model and prior distributions. Section 1.5 presents the MCMC algorithm. Section 1.6 discusses
the computation of Bayes factors used for hypothesis testing. Section 1.7 calculates treatment
effects. An example with artificially generated data is provided in section 1.8. Section 1.9 describes
the empirical application and the data. Finally, section 1.10 discusses the results and section 1.11
concludes.
1.2 Background on managed care
Managed care organizations emerged as a result of the failure of traditional fee-for-service (FFS)
plans to contain costs of health care through consumer cost sharing. Unlike indemnity plans,
the early managed care plans, known as “staff” and “group” HMOs, used exclusively supply side
methods to reduce costs (see Glied, 2000). Staff and group HMOs were fully vertically integrated
organizations. In staff HMOs the provider of health care employed a limited number of physicians
and owned the hospitals while in group HMOs a group of physicians and hospitals contracted
exclusively with an insurance organization. Over-utilization of services was prevented by paying
physicians a salary in the case of staff HMOs or a fixed payment for each patient (capitation
payment) in the case of group HMOs. With a salary payment doctors have no incentive to provide
more services while with capitation payment they bear the full cost of treatment for each patient
and as a result they have incentives to avoid costly procedures and limit the provision of services.
Treatment intensity was also monitored implicitly through the use of “gatekeepers” or explicitly
through utilization review. In gatekeeper arrangements patients can consult a specialist only if they
obtain a referral from a primary care physician (gatekeeper). On his part the primary care physician
is restricted to limit the number of referrals he makes. Therefore, in cases where treatment can
be offered by either the primary care physician or the specialist, the use of gatekeepers reduces
significantly the cost of treatment. On the other hand, these early HMO plans provided more
generous benefits especially in the form of preventive and maternity care in order to attract healthier
population and prevent serious diseases and more expensive procedures.
Eventually, the market share of staff and group HMOs diminished and new less integrated
types of HMOs emerged. The Independent Practice Association (IPA) type includes insurance
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plans that contract with physicians who work independently in their own offices and retain the
option to contract with other managed care organizations and treat patients enrolled in indemnity
plans. Payments to participating physicians are made either on a capitation or a discounted fee-
for-service basis. Depending on the market power of the HMO relative to the market power of
physicians and hospitals in the region, an IPA-type HMO can discount fees paid to physicians
and hospitals in exchange for including them in its network. Reimbursing on a discount fee-for-
service basis is cost saving relative to paying the full price for the service (as in indemnity plans)
but it does not remove the incentive for excessive service provision by physicians. Given that
consumer cost-sharing is also limited in IPA-HMOs, the intensity of service provided to patients
is controlled using gatekeeper arrangements, “second opinion” processes and utilization review.
Utilization review is common policy especially for expensive procedures (surgery, hospitalization,
major diagnostic tests). Enrollees or their physicians are required to receive prior authorization
from the insurance plans to proceed with the proposed treatment. In second opinion arrangements,
a physician paid by the insurer provides a second opinion usually regarding a surgery. However,
he is not the provider of the treatment and therefore has no financial incentives to offer a bias
recommendation.
Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO) which are nowadays the dominant form of employment
based group insurance differ from IPAs in that they do not require enrollees to obtain referrals from
a primary care physician before consulting a specialist. Subscribers have also the option to consult
physicians or visit hospitals from outside the network. In this sense PPO is a less integrated
form of managed care. However, the use of services provided by the plan’s network of providers
is strongly encouraged by applying higher co-payments as well as deductibles for out-of-network
services. Discounted fee-for-service is the most usual payment method.
Finally, Point-of-Service (POS) plans share common features with HMOs, and PPOs. Like
PPOs, point-of-service plans allow their policy holders to receive medical care outside the network,
though use of facilities and physicians within the network is encouraged. However, subscribers are
required to choose a primary care physician (who acts as a gatekeeper) from the provider’s network,
a feature of HMO plans.
Utilization of medical services across enrollees in different insurance plans can vary significantly
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as the result of two underlying factors: the incentive effect (or moral hazard) and the selection
effect. Moral hazard can arise if physicians provide excessive treatment to those individuals with
generous insurance. On the other hand, the selection effect is present if individuals enrolled in
an insurance plan have different characteristics than the average individual. For example, higher
utilization rates for FFS enrollees relative to HMO enrollees may reflect in part that those with
a FFS plan are less healthy. Indeed, several studies have documented that managed care and
traditional plan enrollees may differ in factors such as socioeconomic and health status, expected
future use of health care and risk preferences.
Traditional indemnity FFS plans attack the moral hazard problem exclusively through consumer
(demand) cost-sharing. Co-payments and deductibles in FFS plans are a percentage of the total
cost of treatment so that consumers bear a share of their consumption of health care. Managed
care organizations emerged as a result of the failure of traditional FFS plans to contain costs of
health care through consumer cost sharing. As explained above pure HMOs relied heavily on sup-
ply cost sharing (capitation payment), gatekeeper arrangements, utilization review, administrative
regulations and other supply side mechanisms to control moral hazard while demand cost-sharing
was limited. The evolution of managed care organizations from staff and group HMOs to IPA-type
HMOs, PPOs, and POS plans is an effort to solve some of the problems of the original HMO plans.
Higher co-payments (even though they are still a fixed fee and lower than in indemnity plans)
enhance the role of consumer’s cost-sharing in reducing the degree of moral hazard. On the other
hand, these more recent forms of managed care are more flexible in the sense that they do not
restrict consumers to in-network providers.
It is apparent from the above discussion that moral hazard and self selection are two different
problems for the policymakers. The empirical distinction between incentive and selection effects
would help the insurer design the insurance plan efficiently. If increased utilization is the result of
adverse selection but the incentive effect is weak, the policy maker could reverse the situation by
introducing strategies of favorable selection (e.g. target communities with younger and healthier
populations, provide generous maternity care etc). On the other hand, if moral hazard is the pri-
mary effect, implementation of higher deductibles and co-payments as well as supply side strategies
can be used.
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Empirical research on managed care has become increasingly complicated over time due to
the proliferation of different types of managed care plans, the adoption of managed care features
by conventional insurance plans, and the recognition of self-selection issues. As the new forms
of managed care organizations moved towards less integrated schemes, the distinction between
different types of insurance plans has become a much more difficult task. Moreover, even plans
with the same characteristics may actually differ due to unobserved (to the researchers) factors such
as the stringency of each plan’s utilization review or details regarding administrative regulations
that aim to control the use of services. The picture is actually even fuzzier because the traditional
fee-for-service plans have incorporated managed care features such as utilization review.
Nonetheless, the most serious challenge for researchers is the problem of selection bias. If the
population enrolled in managed care plans has different characteristics from those subscribed in
indemnity plans then observed differences in utilization of services may reflect in part adverse selec-
tion. Indeed, several studies have documented that HMO populations are younger and healthier.
Other studies have found that HMOs are likely to attract a larger proportion of new migrants,
families who expect to need maternity care, and individuals who expect to use a high level of
outpatient services. In general, managed care and traditional plan enrollees may differ in factors
such as socioeconomic and health status, expected future use of health care and risk preferences.
Studies that do not control for these differences may suffer from selection bias and be unreliable.
Furthermore, there might be unobserved factors such as unobserved severity of illness that result
in self-selection but fewer studies focus on this.
Beside the problems, empirical research has attempted to identify the effects of managed care on
various measures of health care utilization (hospital admissions, hospital stays, outpatient services,
non-physician visits etc). Early studies using observational data have been criticized on the grounds
of inadequate control of health status and other observed characteristics. (Luft (1981) provides a
review of studies dating from 1950 to 1978).
In the context of the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, Manning et al. (1984), assigned
people randomly into an HMO and several different FFS plans with varying levels of cost-sharing
and benefits. Enrollees who were randomly assigned to the HMO plan had 40% lower inpatient
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admission rates and significantly shorter hospital stays than those in a FFS plan with no cost-
sharing. On the other hand there was no evidence that the number of outpatient visits was higher
for HMO subscribers. In addition, patients randomly assigned to the HMO plan were compared with
patients who self-selected themselves in the HMO. The comparison revealed only minor disparities
between the two groups indicating that studies using non-experimental data may not suffer from
selection effects. Although selection bias is not an issue with experimental data, the RAND study
was criticized by Bruce et al. (1987) on the basis of a high percentage (29%) of refusals to participate
in the experiment.
Miller and Luft (1994, 1997, 2002) updated Luft’s review to include more recent studies while
limiting their focus on those papers that controlled at least for observed characteristics. Reschovsky
(2000); Reschovsky and Kemper (2000) argued that the threat of selection and the risk of unmea-
sured (though observed) differences reduces by employing an especially rich set of control variables.
Comparing HMO effects on those with and without a ready choice between HMO and non-HMO
plans eliminated the possibility of remaining selection bias.
1.3 Count Data - Hurdle models
The simplest model that deals with count outcomes is the Poisson regression model (PRM). In the
PRM the number of events y has a Poisson distribution:
P (yi = k | xi) =
exp(−λi)λki
k!
, k = 0, 1, 2, ...
and the conditional mean λi = E(yi | xi) is expressed as a function of observable individual
attributes. To ensure nonegativity, λi is specified as λi = exp(xiβ) where β is a vector of parameters.
Different values of xi (i.e. individuals with different characteristics) result in different values for the
conditional mean. However, individuals with exactly the same attributes have the same conditional
mean. This feature of the PRM is known as observed heterogeneity.
Besides its simplicity, in practical applications the PRM performs poorly in fitting the observed
data. A restrictive feature of the PRM is that it assumes equidispersion while in most count data
applications the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean (overdispersion). A possible
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explanation for the overdispersed data is the presence of some form of unobserved heterogeneity.
In this case, even individuals with same characteristics can have different conditional means. It
is important that although unobserved heterogeneity results in overdispersion, the opposite does
not always hold true. Hence, a formal test for overdispersion cannot be considered as a test for
unobserved heterogeneity.
An additional problem is that many count data sets present a high proportion of zero counts
relative to the frequency of zeros predicted by the PRM. Overdispersion and excess zeros have been
investigated in the literature as different problems. However, Mullahy (1998) pointed out that they
are both consequences of unobserved heterogeneity.
Mixture models attempt to formalize the concept of unobserved heterogeneity by introducing
an additional error term in the conditional mean of the dependent count variable. The most widely
used mixture is the Negative Binomial regression model (NB), which is obtained as a Poisson-
Gamma mixture. Formally, the conditional mean of the Poisson is specified as:
λ̃i = exp(Xiβ + εi) = exp(Xiβ) exp(εi) = λiδi
where εi and Xi are uncorrelated. Under this specification, the variation in λ̃i depends not only on
different individual attributes but also on unobserved heterogeneity reflected in the random term.
The marginal distribution of yi is obtained by integrating out δi:





where g(δi) is the density of δi. Further, it is assumed that δi follows a Gamma distribution
G(αi, γi) with the shape parameter αi and the scale parameter γi being equal so that E(δi) = 1
and V ar(δi) = 1/αi. The marginal density is:












V ar(yi | Xi) = λi(1 +
λi
αi
) > λi = E(yi | Xi)
Since the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean the model allows for overdispersion.
The NB model is identified when assumptions about the mean and variance are made. The mean is
identified by imposing E(δi) = 1. The NB2 is taken for restricting the variance of δ to be constant:
V ar(δi) = 1/αi = α > 0 which means that αi must be the same across individuals. In this case:
V ar(yi | Xi) = λi(1 + αλi)
The NB1 is obtained by setting V ar(δi) = α/λi which implies
V ar(yi | Xi) = λi(1 + α)
The dispersion parameter α explains overdispersion and is estimated by the model. Clearly, if
α = 0 the model reduces to the PRM. Moreover, the increased variance of the NB model allows
for higher proportion of low counts and handles better a higher percentage of zeros than the PRM.
Yet, in applications with high proportion of zeros an explicit modeling of the process that generates
zeros is required. This purpose is well served by hurdle models.
The term “hurdle” was first introduced by Cragg (1971). Since then, hurdle models have
gained popularity because of their ability to model two-part decision making processes. The first
part refers to the decision of initiating or not an event while the second part refers to the number
of times the event occurs given that it has been initiated. Such a dual decision making structure
is frequently met in health literature. The decision to utilize medical services can be thought of as
consisting of two separate stages. At the first stage, the patient decides independently whether to
visit a physician or not based on factors such as health status, insurance coverage, access to health
care and others. At the second stage, the physician decides the intensity of treatment (subsequent
visits or referrals to a specialist). This stage is sometimes referred to as the frequency decision.
An appropriate modeling would require the contact decision and the frequency decision treated as
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different stochastic processes. In the hurdle model this is achieved by assuming two different data
generating processes for the zero and positive counts.
Let yi, i = 1, ..., N be the discrete response variable and Xi a vector of explanatory variables.
Zero counts are generated with probability P (yi = 0 | Xi, θ1) where θ1 is a parameter vector. With
probability 1−P (yi = 0 | Xi, θ1) the hurdle is crossed and positive counts are generated according
to a truncated at zero distribution denoted as P (yi | yi > 0, Xi, θ2) where θ2 is a parameter
vector. Therefore, the first stage (contact decision) is modeled by a binary model governing whether
the hurdle is crossed and the second stage (frequency decision) is modeled by a truncated at
zero model generating strictly positive counts. The parameter sets θ1 and θ2 are different so
that the explanatory variables have different impact at each stage. The likelihood function for N





I (yi = 0)P (yi = 0 | Xi, θ1) + I (yi > 0) [1− P (yi = 0 | Xi, θ1)]
P (yi | Xi, θ2)
P (yi > 0 | Xi, θ2)
}
(1.1)
where I (ω ∈ Ω) is an indicator function taking a value of one if ω ∈ Ω and zero otherwise.
The likelihood can be expressed as the product of two likelihood functions that are parametri-









I (yi = 0) + I (yi > 0)
P (yi | Xi, θ2)
P (yi > 0 | Xi, θ2)
}
(1.2)
The first product is the likelihood for the binary choice model (zero counts versus positive counts)
and the second product is the likelihood for the truncated at zero model.
The conditional mean and variance depend on the probability the hurdle is crossed and the
10
moments of the truncated at zero distribution:
E(yi | Xi) = P (yi > 0 | Xi, θ1)ET (yi | yi > 0, Xi) (1.3)
V ar(yi | Xi) = P (yi > 0 | Xi, θ1)V arT (yi | yi > 0, Xi)
+P (yi = 0 | Xi, θ1)[ET (yi | yi > 0, Xi)]2 (1.4)
Various specifications for the binary and the truncated part have been proposed in the lit-
erature. Mullahy (1986) proposed a Poisson and a Geometric hurdle model. For the Poisson
specification:
P (yi = 0 | Xi, β1) = exp[− exp(Xiβ1)], (1.5)


















Obviously, when β1 = β2 the likelihood reduces to the likelihood of the parent Poisson.
For the geometric specification,








i.e. the first stage is described by a standard logit model while the second stage by a truncated at
zero geometric model.
Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1994) assumed that the underlying distribution for both stages is NB1.
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Their hurdle model estimated the demand for health care in West Germany as a two part decision-
making process using data from the German Socioeconomic Panel. They claimed that the choice
of a hurdle specification is justified by the institutional setting of the German’s health insurance
system. The insured receives on request a sickness voucher from the sickness fund each quarter.
It is to her discretion to visit a physician (of her choice) but once he has submitted the voucher,
medical services are provided by this physician only. Hence, at the first stage the patient makes
the decision whether to visit a physician or not while at the second stage it is the physician who
determines the length of treatment.
Gerdtham (1997) employed a hurdle model to test the null hypothesis of no horizontal inequity
in the delivery of health care in Sweden. Having defined equity as equal treatment for equal need
he focused on two measures of treatment: physician visits and hospital care weeks. The use of a
hurdle model in his application is justified by the large proportion of zeros (38.8% for physician
visits and 91.3% for hospital care weeks) as well as on theoretical grounds. For example, the two
part structure makes it possible to assess whether income has its effect on utilization through the
contact decision or the frequency decision. His hurdle specification is a logit model for the binary
choice and a truncated at zero NB2 model for the number of physician visits or hospital care weeks.
Gurmu (1998) proposed generalized hurdle models. For the first stage he suggested a general-
ization of the logit model that allows for asymmetry in the two tails of the cumulative probability
curve P (yi > 0 | Xi, θ1). For the second part he proposed a truncated at zero NB2 or a truncated
at zero Double Poisson (DP) model that allows for overdispersed as well as underdispersed count
data.
In another paper, Gurmu (1997) developed a semiparametric estimation method for hurdle
models. Parametric estimation that allows for unobserved heterogeneity requires knowledge of the
distribution of unobservables. For example, the NB hurdle assumes that the unobserved hetero-
geneity is Gamma distributed. Misspecification of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity
leads to inconsistent estimates. The advantage of the semiparametric estimation is that it avoids a
distributional assumption for the unobserved heterogeneity. The method is applied to study the
impact of managed care programmes for Medicaid eligibles on the number of doctor and health
centre visits.
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Winkelmann (2004) combined a probit model for the binary choice part with a truncated
Poisson-log-normal mixture for strictly positive outcomes. The Poisson-log-normal mixture can
be derived introducing the unobserved heterogeneity in the conditional mean and assuming that it
is normally distributed. The above hurdle specification was used to investigate the impact of the
German health care reform of 1997 on the number of doctor visits.
The interpretation of the hurdle model as an intuitive way to describe a two-part decision
process is appealing. However, there is a problem mentioned by several authors. In cases where the
observation period is relatively long (one year) the probability of observing multiple illness spells
and therefore multiple first contacts increases. For example, it is reasonable to think that in an
one-year period patients with more than one trip to a hospital consist of a high percentage among
the population. Although, the first part of the hurdle model can still be thought as describing the
contact decision, the second part should be interpreted either as the frequency decision determined
by physicians or as the patient’s decision to initiate subsequent trips to the hospital. If there is
no reason to believe that the decision to contact a physician for the first time is different than the
decision for subsequent visits, the two-part structure can be questioned. It is worthy to mention that
quarterly data (as in Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1994)) reduce significantly the possibility of multiple
illness spells thereby increasing the appeal of the structural interpretation of the hurdle model.
In light of the above criticism, Deb and Trivedi (2002) contrasted the hurdle model (referred in
their paper as the two-part model TPM) with a latent class model (LCM) and they found strong
evidence in favor of the LCM. Instead of distinguishing between users and non-users of health care,
the LCM distinguishing between frequent and infrequent users. This is achieved by assuming that
the count variable is drawn from an additive mixture of S distinct subpopulations so that the
density for observation i = 1, ..., n is given by:






πj = 1, 0 < πj < 1
where the subpopulation densities fj are usually the same distributions but with different param-
eterizations θj for each component. The slope coefficients of the index function π1, ..., πS are the
mixing probabilities and are estimated along with parameters θj .
13
A natural interpretation of the mixture components is possible: Deb and Trivedi hypothesized
that unobserved differences in individual’s long-term health status (not captured by self-perceived
health status and chronic conditions) split the population into subpopulations. For instance, the
model with two latent classes can be thought as dividing the population into the “healthy” group
characterized by low utilization of medical services and the “ill” group with high utilization. There-
fore, in addition to unobserved heterogeneity within each component, the LCM assumes that un-
observed heterogeneity splits the population into latent classes.
Santos Silva and Windmeijer (2001) proposed a two-part model that allows for multiple illness





where Rj is the number of visits in the jth spell. Assuming that the conditional expectation of
Rj does not depend on j and that S and Rj are conditionally independent, the total number
of visits V has a stopped-sum distribution. An example of a stopped-sum distribution is the
negative binomial which is derived assuming a Poisson distribution for the number of spells S and
a logarithmic distribution for the number of visits in the jth spell Rj .
1.4 Model Specification
We observe N independent observations yi (i = 1, ..., N). For each individual i we define a latent
variable Hi (thereafter referred to as hurdle) which can be thought of as the individual’s propensity
to initiate a treatment episode. When the zero hurdle is crossed (Hi > 0), positive counts are
generated according to a truncated at zero Poisson log-normal mixture with conditional mean
exp(µi) which is specified below. Otherwise, zero counts are generated. The counts are measures
of health care utilization (outpatient physician visits in the application). Therefore:
 yi | yi > 0 ∼ P (exp(µi)) if Hi ≥ 0yi = 0 if Hi < 0 . (1.10)
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The insurance (selection) equation is defined by specifying latent variable Zi, reflecting the
propensity to purchase managed care type of health insurance, and a binary treatment variable di
taking a value of 1 if the individual chooses the treated state (chooses to enroll in a managed care
plan) and zero otherwise:
Zi = Wiα+ ui, ui ∼ N (0, 1) , (1.11)
di =
 1, Zi ≥ 00, Zi < 0 , (1.12)
where Wi is a vector of exogenous explanatory variables, Zi is linked to the treatment di through the
observability condition (1.12) and random variable ui captures the effect of all unobserved factors
that affect the insurance decision. For identification purposes its variance must be fixed such that
ui is assumed to be standard normally distributed.
We model endogeneity by specifying the hurdle and the conditional mean as
Hi = Xiβ + ρ1di + π1ui + ηi, ηi ∼ N (0, 1) , (1.13)
µi = Xiγ + ρ2di + π2ui + εi, εi ∼ N(0, σ), (1.14)
where ηi and εi are independent of ui, such that cov(ui, ηi) = 0 and cov(ui, εi) = 0. Hi and µi
are linear in the set of explanatory variables Xi and the treatment di. In addition, we assume that
cov (εi, ηi) = 0.
Under this specification, the unobserved parts of Hi and µi, captured by random variables
π1ui + ηi and π2ui + εi, are correlated with the insurance equation through random variable ui.
This is the mechanism through which endogeneity of insurance to utilization is modeled.
We estimate the Endogenous Hurdle Poisson-lognormal model choosing prior distributions as
follows. Since no prior information is available about parameters α, β, γ, ρ1,ρ2, we center their
priors at zero values with a relatively large variance such that:
α ∼ N(0p, 10Ip), β ∼ N(0k, 10Ik), γ ∼ N(0k, 10Ik).
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We choose priors for π1 and π2:
π1 ∼ N(0, 1/2) and π2 ∼ N(0, 1/2),
as well as for ρ1 and ρ2:
ρ1 ∼ N(0, 1/2) and ρ2 ∼ N(0, 1/2)






)−1) where η0 = 5 and c0 = 3.
1.5 Estimation
We use MCMC methods to estimate the posterior distributions of the parameters of our model as
well as various treatment effects.
Let ∆̃ = (α, β, γ, ρ1, ρ2, π1, π2, σ) denote the parameter set, and ∆i = (∆̃, Xi,Wi). Then the
joint density of observed and latent data for observation i is given by:






× [I(di = 1)I(Zi ≥ 0) + I(di = 0)I(Zi ≤ 0)]
× [I(yi = 0)I(Hi ≤ 0) +
exp(− exp(µi)) exp(µiyi)
yi!(1− exp(− exp(µi)))
I(Hi ≥ 0)I(yi > 0)]
× ϕ(Hi ; Xiβ + ρ1di + π1(Zi −Wiα), 1)










pdf, and I (x ∈ X) is an indicator function taking a value
of 1 if the random variable x belongs to the set X and zero otherwise. The posterior density is
proportional to the product of the prior density and the distribution of observables and latent
variables over all N observations.
We organize the MCMC algorithm in the following steps by blocking the parameters as Zi, Hi,
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µi, α, (β′, ρ1, π1)′, (γ′, ρ2, π2)′, σ.


















π1 (Hi −Xiβ − ρ1di) + π2σ−1 (µi −Xiγ − ρ2di)
]
, (1.18)




2. The full conditional of Hi is
Hi
i.i.d.∼ TN(−∞,0) (Xiβ + ρ1di + π1(Zi −Wiα), 1) if yi = 0, (1.20)
Hi
i.i.d.∼ TN(0,∞) (Xiβ + ρ1di + π1(Zi −Wiα), 1) if yi > 0. (1.21)
3. If Hi < 0 one has to draw µi from N (Xiγ + ρ2di + π2(Zi −Wiα), σ) . If Hi > 0 the full
conditional density for µi is:
π (µi | yi, di, Zi,∆i) ∝
exp(− exp(µi)) exp(µiyi)
yi! (1− exp(− exp(µi)))
× ϕ (µi ; Xiγ + ρ2di + π2(Zi −Wiα), σ) .
(1.22)
In order to sample µi we utilize the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm which uses a proposal
density independent across draws. Geweke (1989) argued that the proposal density should
have tails at least as fat as the posterior. For that reason we select the t-distribution with a
small number of degrees of freedom as the candidate-generating density. Following Chib et
al. (1998), we tailor the proposal density to the target density centered at its modal value
∧
µi = arg max lnπ (µi | yi,di, Zi,∆i) . To obtain the mode we implement the Newton-Raphson
algorithm using the gradient vector gµi and the Hessian Hµi of lnπ (µi | yi,di, Zi,∆i) . Then
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is the negative inverse of the Hessian evaluated at the mode, and v are
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α = H−1a A (1.25)


























and let δ1 = (β′, ρ1, π1)′ and Ci = (Xi, di, (Zi −Wiα))































































































To test the null hypothesis of no endogeneity of the treatment variable (H0 : π1 = π2 = 0) we need
to compare the unrestricted model M1 and model M0 under the constraints π1 = π2 = 0. For model
comparison with equal prior weight attached to each model the posterior odds ratio becomes the





where π (y |Mi) is the marginal likelihood for model Mi. Since the models are nested we can apply
the Savage-Dickey ratio approach to calculate the Bayes factor (see Verdinelli and Wasserman,
1995). Suppose that the parameter set of a model is θ = (ω, ψ) and we want to test the null
hypothesis ω = ω0. Dickey (1971) showed that if the prior for ψ in the restricted and unrestricted
models is the same at the point ω = ω0 then the Bayes factor can be calculated as
B01 =
π (ω0 | y)
π (ω0)








where π (π∗1, π
∗




The priors for π1 and π2 must be specified carefully. In Bayesian estimation the effect of priors
diminishes as the sample size becomes fairly large. However, as shown in Kass and Raftery (1995),
Bayesian testing differs from estimation in that the effect of the prior density may not vanish as
the sample size increases. As a result, the Bayes factor is sensitive to the choice of priors. Improper
priors (that can be used for estimation and prediction) will always choose the null hypothesis and
therefore are not acceptable for hypothesis testing. Even informative priors with a large spread
on πi under H1 may provide overwhelming support to the model with fewer parameters regardless
of the data, thereby favoring the restricted model. For that reason we choose informative priors.
1.7 Treatment effects
We are interested in evaluating treatment effects of the insurance choice. The literature on treat-
ment effects provides various treatment parameters (see Heckman et al., 2001). We calculate two of
them: the average treatment effect (ATE) and the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET).
Denote YMC and YFFS two potential utilization variables in the treated and untreated states
respectively. The treatment effect (TE) for each individual i in the sample is the expected gain, in
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We define the treated group as the individuals covered by any managed care plan (HMO or PPO),





E[YMC,i − YFFS,i | Xi, di = 1] =
∧
E[YMC,i | Xi, di = 1]−
∧
E[YFFS,i | Xi, di = 1]. (1.32)
Accordingly, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) is defined as the mean effect of








E[YMC,i − YFFS,i | Xi, di = 1], (1.33)
where NT is the number of such enrollees.
We estimate the posterior distributions of the ATE and ATET evaluating expressions (1.32)
and (1.33) at the posterior distributions of the parameters of the model and report their posterior
means and standard deviations.
1.8 Numerical Example
In this section we provide a numerical example to check the performance of the estimation method.
We also estimate a restricted model that ignores the endogeneity of the treatment variable to
demonstrate the signs and magnitudes of self-selection biases. We begin by generating artificial
data (5,000 observations) such that about 50% of the counts are positive (they cross the hurdle)
and the remaining are zeros. Also, 50% of the observations have the treatment (d = 1) and for the
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rest d = 0. We generate the data as follows:
1. Generate:
Xi = (1, xi) , xi ∼ N (0, 1) ,
Wi = (1, wi) , wi ∼ N (0, 1) ,
ui ∼ N(0, 1),
e1i = π1ui + ηi, ηi ∼ N (0, 1) ,
e2i = π2ui + εi, εi ∼ N (0, σ) ,
and specify: α = (0, 1) , β = (−0.25, 1) , γ = (1, 2) ,
π1 = π2 = −0.5, ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.5, σ = 0.5.
As the negative signs assigned to the correlation parameters π1 and π2 reveal, data are gener-
ated assuming favorable selection bias in both stages of the hurdle model. On the other hand,
the positive signs of ρ1and ρ2 imply that the pure treatment effects (or incentive effects) are
positive.
2. Generate Zi = Wiα+ ui such that di =
 1, if Zi ≥ 00, if Zi < 0 ,
Hi = Xiβ + ρ1di + e1i such that hi =
 1, if Hi ≥ 00, if Hi < 0 ,
and µi = exp (Xiγ + ρ2di + e2i) .
3. Finally, generate yi such that
 yi = 0, if hi = 0yi ∼ truncated P (µi) , if hi > 0 .
We run our MCMC algorithm for 5,000 replications and we collect every 10th replication after
discarding the first 1000 replications of the burn-in phase. In addition, we generate 500 observations
according to the proposed model in order to check the performance of the estimation method for
different sample sizes.
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Table A.11 presents estimates of the posterior means and standard deviations for the unre-
stricted models with 500 and 5000 observations, and the restricted (π1 = π2 = 0) model. The
estimates ρ1 and ρ2 of the restricted model are far from their true values implying a self-selection
effect. However, when the endogeneity of the treatment variable is taken into account the posterior
means of the coefficients are very close to the true values.
Formally, we compare the two models utilizing the Savage-Dickey density ratio approach. The
Bayes factor is found to be 1.35×10−7 which provides decisive evidence against the null hypothesis
H0 : π1 = π2 = 0. The autocorrelation functions (ACF) of the coefficients die off after 5 lags for all
parameters.
We calculate the Average Treatment Effect and the Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
to be: ATE = 0.44 (0.26) and ATET = 0.41 (0.28). Due to favorable selection bias the unobserved
factors that induce individuals to be in the treated state, affect negatively the propensity to cross
the hurdle and the conditional mean of the count variable. Therefore, those in the treated group
will expect to gain less in terms of utilization from choosing the treatment than those without the
treatment.
1.9 Application
We investigate the effect of managed care on outpatient physician visits. Our sample consists of
the privately insured US population aged 21-64 and is obtained from the Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey. MEPS is a nationally representative survey conducted by the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (AHRQ) and it provides data on health care use, expenditures, sources of
payment, and insurance coverage for the US civilian non-institutionalized population. It uses an
overlapping panel design according to which data are collected from each household for two calendar
years while a new sample of households is surveyed each subsequent year. In other words, in each
survey year (after the first), one sample of persons is in its second year of responses while another
one is surveyed for the first time. We use data from all available surveys (1996-2002). However, we
exclude observations of those in their first year of responses (and therefore all 1996 observations)
1All tables of this chapter are placed in Appendix A.
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since one of our exclusion restrictions is the lag of the spouse’ s private insurance. We further
restrict our sample to employed but not self-employed reducing the sample size to 16,513.
A preliminary description of the distribution of the dependent variable is given in Table A.2.
Outpatient physician visits present a slightly greater unconditional mean in the population insured
by a FFS insurance plan. The percentage of zero counts is 85.07% which justifies the use of a hurdle
model.
Definitions and summary statistics of all variables are given in Table A.3. The explanatory vari-
ables in the hurdle and mean equations are the same. Specifically, we include demographic variables
(BLACK, HISPANIC, FAMSIZE, FEMALE, MARRIED, EDUCYR, AGE), self-perceived health
status variables (VEGOOD, GOOD, FAIRPOOR) excluding excellent health status, variables mea-
suring the number of chronic conditions and the number of injuries (NUMCHRON, NUMINJ),
geographical variables (NOREAST, MIDWEST, SOUTH, MSA) which capture differences in the
local healthcare markets, year dummies excluding the dummy for 1997, an economic variable (IN-
COME), and an insurance variable (MANAGED). In addition the variable AGE2 is included to
capture non-linear dependence of utilization and age.
The explanatory variables in the insurance equation are the same with the addition of three
exclusion restrictions: spouse’s age (SPOUAGE), the square of spouse’s age (SPOUAGE2), and
SPOUPRIV which takes a value of one if the spouse of the individual had private insurance coverage
in the previous year and zero otherwise. The purpose of the exclusion restrictions is to identify the
correlation between the hurdle and mean equations and the insurance equation. Good instruments
are those which are uncorrelated with the error terms in the hurdle and mean equations (exogeneity)
and in addition they are highly correlated with the endogenous variable (insurance status). Both
spouse’s age and the lag of spouse’s private insurance do not affect utilization, therefore satisfying
exogeneity. We use the lag of spouse’s private health insurance because the current private health
insurance of the spouse may not be exogenous to utilization. On the other hand both variables
have predictive power over the individual’s insurance decision.
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1.10 Results
We estimate our model running the Markov chain for 5000 replications and discarding the first 1000
replications of the burn-in phase during which the chain converges to the stationary distribution.
In Table A.4 we report the posterior means and standard deviations of the parameters. Health
status variables have strong positive impacts on the decision to utilize services (the hurdle part),
the conditional mean of outpatient visits (truncated part) and the insurance decision. In contrast,
chronic conditions and injuries do not affect insurance. Family size has a strong negative effect on
the decision to visit a physician but no effect on the frequency of visits and the insurance decision.
Being female, black or Hispanic has strong positive impact on the decision to subscribe to managed
care plans and no effect on the number of outpatient visits. However, it is less likely for blacks
and Hispanics to make an outpatient physician visit at least once within a year. Education has
strong positive impacts on both the hurdle part and the conditional mean but affects negatively
the enrollment to a managed care plan. It is also interesting that income is weak in all cases.
The posterior means and standard deviations for the correlation parameters π1 and π2 are -
0.586(0.354) and 0.022(0.155) respectively while for the coefficients of managed care ρ1 and ρ2 the
posterior means and standard deviations are 0.894 (0.555) and 0.015 (0.253). That is, only π1 and
ρ1 are strong. This is an indication of selection bias in the hurdle part. Unobserved factors that
affect the insurance decision, do also affect the decision whether to make zero or positive outpatient
visits. An interpretation of the negative sign of π1 is that individuals who self-select themselves
into HMO or PPO plans are on average healthier than those who are randomly assigned to these
plans. Since they are healthier, they will initiate fewer treatment episodes on average.
The incentive effect is captured by ρ1. Since we have controlled for selection bias on both ob-
served and unobserved factors, ρ1 can be interpreted as the pure effect of the insurance variable
on the first stage utilization decision. The positive sign implies that managed care insurance plans
influence positively their patient’s decision whether to visit an outpatient center or not. This re-
sult is quite expected: managed care plans have attempted to control resource utilization through
administrative efforts that encourage outpatient services and discourage the use of inpatient pro-
cedures. For instance, more stringent utilization review has been employed to ensure that surgical
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procedures are not performed in the hospital when they can be performed in outpatient centers.
The separation of the incentive effect from the selection effect has strong policy implications.
Ignoring self-selectivity on unobservables could have led to the misleading conclusion that managed
care plans affect negatively the decision to make an outpatient visit.
As explained in section 6, a formal test for the endogeneity of the treatment variable is based on
the calculation of the Bayes factor. The estimated Bayes factor is 1.223 (0.341), which provides no
evidence in favor of one of the competing models. This is expected since the correlation parameter
π2 is weak thereby failing to identify a selection effect in the mean equation. The calculation of the
Bayes factor with a different set of priors was also inconclusive.
Finally, we are interested in evaluating treatment effects from subscribing in MCOs. The average
treatment effect for the treated is ATET = 0.094 (0.061) and the average treatment effect is ATE =
0.129 (0.085). Therefore, those in the treated group will expect to gain less in terms of utilization
from choosing the treatment than those without the treatment.
Next we divide treated individuals into three groups according to the self perceived health status
(excellent, very good, good and fair or poor health) and report in Table A.5 the mean and standard
deviation of the ATET for each group. Clearly, the ATET is greater for those with fair or poor
health implying that selection is stronger for this group.
1.11 Conclusions
Empirical research has provided mixed evidence on the effect of managed care insurance plans on
the demand for medical services. A well known problem in this literature is that managed care plan
members may differ from conventional insurance enrollees in terms of their health status and other
observed and unobserved attributes. While most of the studies employ rich sets of control variables
to account for differences in observed characteristics, unobserved differences among enrollees in
different types of insurance plans are ignored in most cases.
The endogenous Hurdle Poisson log-Normal model developed in this paper accounts for selection
on unobservables by explicitly modeling unobserved factors that may affect both the insurance
decision and the utilization of outpatient care. In addition, it handles the large proportion of zero
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counts (85% zero outpatient physician visits) in this particular application.
The model was applied to a sample of privately insured individuals aged 21-64 all whom are
employed but not self-employed. Estimation of the model provided evidence of favorable selection
in the hurdle part. A possible explanation is that managed care plans attract relatively healthier
individuals who expect to make zero outpatient visits. After controlling for selection bias, the
impact of a managed care plan on the decision to make an outpatient visit was found positive.
Ignoring self-selectivity on unobservables could have led to the misleading conclusion that managed
care plans reduce the number of positive outpatient visits. Calculation of the Average Treatment
Effects (ATE) and the Average Treatment Effects for the Treated (ATET) revealed that managed
care enrollees gain less in terms of utilization from choosing a managed care plan than the average




Bayesian Estimation of an
Endogenous Panel Count Data Model
with Correlated Random Effects: an
Application to Universal Health
Insurance Coverage
2.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to develop and estimate a panel count data model with correlated
random effects, which accounts for endogeneity of a binary choice variable. The estimation ap-
proach is Bayesian and parametric based on Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methodology.
Hierarchical priors are used for the unobserved individual effects so that the model emerges as the
Bayesian analogue of a random effects approach in classical statistics. The empirical part of the
essay estimates the effect of nearly universal insurance coverage – the endogenous treatment vari-
able - on medical utilization measured as the number of doctor visits. The age limit for Medicare
eligibility at age 65 serves as an exclusion restriction.
The main motivation for using panel data methods is the ability to model the intertemporal
behavior of individuals and control for individual heterogeneity without observing it. In linear panel
data models, the unobserved effects can be differenced out. However, differencing is not applicable
in count data models where a natural non-linearity is produced by the non-negative discrete nature
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of the data.1 The most widely used estimation approach for fixed effects count data models is
the conditional maximum likelihood (CML) proposed by Hausman et al. (1984). The motivation
for the CML is to solve the incidental parameters problem which is present in most non linear
panel data models.2 The likelihood function is constructed conditioning on a statistic that contains
all the information about the individual specific parameters. For the Poisson fixed effects model
specifically, conditioning on the sufficient statistic – the total number of counts for each individual –
removes the individual specific parameters from the likelihood.3 However, the Poisson fixed effects
model is one of the few non-linear models for which maximizing the unconditional likelihood gives
the same (consistent) estimates as CML estimation. Unlike the Poisson model, Negative Binomial
(NB) models are affected by the incidental parameters problem. Hausman et al. (1984) estimated
the fixed effects NB1 using CML (see also Greene, 2007).4
In addition to fixed effects, Hausman et al. (1984) proposed a Poisson model with gamma
distributed random effects and a NB2 model with beta distributed random effects. Finally, Chib
et al. (1998), utilized Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques to estimate a Poisson model with
Gaussian random effects.
The estimators discussed above require exogenous explanatory variables. However, in many
applications, the explanatory variables are correlated with the idiosyncratic shocks leading to in-
consistent estimates. Endogeneity and selectivity in count data cross sectional regression models
have been addressed in several ways including method of moments estimators, switching regression
models, matching estimators, and Bayesian methods.
One strand of the literature concerns generalized method of moments (GMM) techniques. Wind-
meijer and Santos Silva (1997) proposed a model in which the count variable is specified with an
additive error term and is simultaneously determined with the binary endogenous variable. Use of
1Differencing in the linear regression sense is not an option. However, moment based methods that use a differ-
encing transformation to eliminate the (multiplicative) fixed effect can be applied (see Cameron and Trivedi, 1998).
2The incidental parameters problem (Neyman and Scott, 1948; Lancaster, 2000) arises in certain applications
of maximum likelihood estimation. In the context of longitudinal data, when the number of individuals increases
(while the number of time periods remains constant and relatively small) the number of parameters in a fixed effects
model increases at the same rate as the sample size leading to inconsistent estimates for all parameters (not only
the individual specific parameters). The logistic fixed effects model is the most well known model affected by the
incidental parameters model. CML fixed effects logit estimation was proposed by Chamberlain (1984).
3Cameron and Trivedi (1998) provide the conditional log-likelihood which is similar to that of the multinomial
logit model.
4However, Allison and Waterman (2002) criticized the model for not controlling for all stable covariates.
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the additive moment condition and instruments that are correlated with the endogenous regressor
but not with the unobservables give consistent GMM estimates. The model has also been specified
with a multiplicative error in the count specification (Mullahy, 1997). Although the additive and
multiplicative models are observationally equivalent when only the first order moment condition
is utilized, Mullahy (1997) and Windmeijer and Santos Silva (1997) showed that the same set of
instruments will not, in general, be orthogonal to both error types. Therefore, the two sets of mo-
ment conditions cannot be valid at the same time. Terza (1998) discussed a FIML approach which
is efficient but computationally burdensome. He also developed a two-stage method of moments
(TSM) estimator for a partially parametric version of the model. The TSM estimator is a nonlinear
least-squares analogue to Heckman’s two stage estimator for linear models with endogenous dum-
mies and avoids the numerical integral approximations required by the FIML estimation. Finally,
he introduced a nonlinear weighted least-squares (NWLS) estimator as an alternative to the FIML
for the fully parametric model. The NWLS estimator is computationally efficient relative to FIML
estimation and statistically efficient relative to the partially parametric TSM estimator.
Van Ophem (2000) presented a method for modeling endogenous selectivity in count data which
is similar in spirit with the switching regression model. The endogenous dummy variable defines
two regimes which are distinguished by different data generating processes. The regime choice is
allowed to be correlated with the observed count in each of the regimes.
Propensity score matching that has been used extensively to deal with selectivity in applications
where a social program or “treatment” is evaluated (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, 1985; Rubin
and Thomas, 1996; Heckman et al., 1997) can be applied without additional concerns in cases
where the outcome of the treatment is a count. However, an important limitation of PSM is that
it accounts only for selection on observables.
Another line of research on endogeneity in count data models involves Bayesian methods. Re-
cent studies have analyzed the effect of endogenous multinomial choice indicators on an ordinal
dependent variable (Munkin and Trivedi, 2008), a self selection model with endogenous binary
treatment and multiple outcomes one of which is a count (Munkin and Trivedi, 2003), a Roy-type
model of selectivity with count outcomes (Deb et al., 2006b), and a two-part model with endogenous
multinomial treatment (Deb et al., 2006a).
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For panel data models, several methods have been suggested to deal with endogeneity when the
outcome equation is linear (see for example Wooldridge, 1995; Kyriazidou, 1997; Vella and Verbeek,
1999; Charlier et al., 2001; Kyriazidou, 2001; Semykina and Wooldridge, 2005). Less attention has
been paid to endogeneity in panel count data: in the case of predetermined regressors,5 Chamberlain
(1992, 1993) and Wooldridge (1997) proposed a quasi-differenced GMM estimator which has been
applied by Cincera (1997), Crepon and Duguet (1997) and Montalvo (1997), and extended to
a dynamic linear feedback model for count data by Blundell et al. (2002). Windmeijer (2000,
2006) showed that the moment condition proposed by Wooldridge (1991, 1997) can also be used to
consistently estimate the parameters in fixed effects count data models with endogenous regressors.
The present essay contributes to the literature on endogenous panel count data models by
proposing a model which assumes a count variable generated according to a Poisson process and a
binary choice variable which is modeled to be endogenous to the count. Unobserved heterogeneity
across individuals enters in the linear specifications of both the Poisson mean and the latent variable
associated with the binary choice by the way of correlated individual specific random effects.
The proposed model is applied to the hotly debated issue of universal health insurance cov-
erage. Advocates of nearly universal coverage argue that the benefits from imposing individual
or employer mandates or providing subsidies to those who are presently uninsured and would like
to buy insurance outweigh the costs. The lower access to and use of health care services by the
uninsured reduces their health status and productivity. Universal access to health services will
result in improved health for the uninsured and increased productivity. In addition, part of current
health care costs are uncompensated care for the uninsured. Hospitals are required by federal or
state law to provide emergency care treatment to the uninsured regardless of their ability to pay.
These costs are shifted to taxpayers supporting public hospitals and private insurers who in turn
pass them on to employers by charging higher premiums. Universal coverage is likely to reduce cost
shifting especially if the utilization gap between insured and uninsured is small. Another argument
in favor of universal coverage is that marketing and underwriting costs, estimated to 1 or 2 percent
of health insurance premiums would be eliminated if insurers were required to accept all applicants,
regardless of health status.
5Regressors that are correlated with past shocks.
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On the other hand, universal coverage will raise the use of health care services by the previously
uninsured. The larger the current access gap between insured and uninsured, the greater the
additional resource cost. Furthermore, administrative costs may as well increase if individual
mandates are introduced. In order to be effective mandates require enforcement which may be
tough and costly especially if subsidies are inefficient and benefits are inappropriate.
Apart from measuring administrative costs (and benefits), costs associated with additional
health care used by the uninsured, savings from cost shifting reduction, and improvements in
health status and productivity a cost benefit analysis would also take into account changes in
utilization per se. It is often stated that universal coverage will reduce unnecessary use of ER by
uninsured individuals who have nowhere else to turn to for primary care. On the other hand, a
severe overcrowding in primary care physician offices throughout the state of Massachusetts has
been reported since the passage of a universal health plan that helped more than 340,000 uninsured
residents in the state get the coverage they need. Therefore, it is of great importance to estimate
changes in utilization of services resulting from expanding insurance protection to Americans who
now lack coverage. Taking into account utilization estimates along with population growth and the
growth rate of active physicians one can predict the pressure on physicians and hospital capacity
for treatment (Long and Marquis, 1994).
Selection bias and endogeneity of insurance are inherent concerns for modeling health care uti-
lization. In studies with observational data individuals are not randomly assigned to have insurance
coverage but they select themselves to the “insured” state based on health status, risk preferences
and socioeconomic factors. Therefore, observed differences in utilization rates between the insured
population and the uninsured may reflect both lower out of pocket costs for the covered individuals
(incentive effects) and selection effects. Universal coverage is expected to change drastically the
utilization incentives of the presently uninsured. Failing to separate incentive from selection effects
the researcher runs the risk of deriving misleading estimates of the impact of universal insurance.
The proposed model estimates the pure incentive effect by modelling the endogeneity of insurance
status. To identify the effect of the treatment (insurance) on the outcome (utilization) and make
the estimates more robust we use Medicare eligibility at 65 as an exclusion restriction. The age
limit at 65 is a natural instrument since insurance coverage rates increase sharply as individuals
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pass their 65th birthday and any changes in utilization rates at 65 are attributed to postponed use
of medical services in anticipation of Medicare coverage (see Card et al., 2004).
The chapter is organized in the following manner. In section 2.2 we formulate the model and
specify prior distributions. The MCMC algorithm is developed in section 2.3. In section 2.4 we
discuss computation of treatment effects and Bayes factor for hypothesis testing. A numerical
example with artificial data tests the performance of the MCMC estimation method in section 2.5.
Section 2.6 presents the empirical application and section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Model Specification
We assume T periods and N individuals. The insurance equation is specified as follows:
Dit = Witα+ θ1i + εit, (2.1)
εit ∼ N (0, 1)
where Dit is a latent variable that reflects individual’s i propensity to be insured at time t, Wit
is an 1 × pa vector of exogenous explanatory variables, θ1i ∼ N(0, σ11) is the individual specific
random effect, α is pa × 1 parameter vector and εit ∼ N(0, 1) is the the idiosyncratic error that
captures the unexplained by Wit and θ1i part of the insurance equation. What we observe is:
dit =
 1, Dit ≥ 00, Dit < 0 (2.2)
where dit (i = 1, ..., N, t = 1, ...T ) is a binary treatment variable taking a value of one if individual
i has any type of health insurance at time t and zero otherwise,
Utilization is modeled through a Poisson model
yit
.∼ P (exp(µit)) (2.3)
where the conditional mean µit is specified as a linear function of explanatory variables Xit and
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the treatment dit. Specifically:
µit = Xitβ + ρdit + θ2i + δεit + uit, uit ∼ N(0, σu) (2.4)
Xit is an 1 × pβ vector of exogenous regressors, θ2i ∼ N(0, σ22) the individual specific random
effect, β is pβ × 1, ρ is 1× 1, and δ is 1× 1 parameter vectors, and uit is an error term. Under this
specification, the idiosyncratic errors of the insurance and utilization equations are correlated. This
is the mechanism through which endogeneity of insurance to utilization is modeled. In addition we





That is, the vector of the random effects θ = (θ1i, θ1i)′ follows a bivariate Normal distribution,
θ ∼ BN(0,Σ).
We estimate the model choosing prior distributions as follows. Since no prior information is
available about parameters α, β we center their priors at zero values with a relatively large variance
such that:
α ∼ N(0p, 10Ip), β ∼ N(0k, 10Ik)
as well as for ρ1 and ρ2:
ρ1 ∼ N(0, 1/2) and ρ2 ∼ N(0, 1/2)







)−1) where η0 = 5 and c0 = 3.
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and an Inverse Wishart prior for Σ





We use MCMC methods to estimate our model. Let
∼
∆ = (α, β, δ, ρ,Σ, σu) be the set of parameters,
and ∆it = (
∼
∆, Xit,Wit). Then the joint density (likelihood) of observed and latent variables for
observation i is:






















where ϕ1(•;µ, σ2) denotes the Normal density N(µ, σ2), ϕ2(•;µ,Σ) denotes the bivariate Normal
density BN(0,Σ), and I (x ∈ X) is an indicator function taking a value of one if the random variable
x belongs to the set X and zero otherwise. The posterior density is the product of the likelihood
f (Yit, dit, Dit, µit, θ1i, θ2i | ∆it) for all N observations times the prior.
We organize the MCMC algorithm in the following steps by blocking the parameters as Dit, µit,
θ1i, θ2i, α, (β′, ρ, δ)′, σ2.




















if dit = 0 (2.8)
where











We draw values from these truncated Normal distributions utilizing an algorithm proposed
by Geweke (1991).
2. From the full conditional density for θ1i and our square completion we get:
θ1i ∼ N(θ1i, V −1θ1i ) (2.11)
where


























σ11 − σ12σ−122 σ12
(2.13)
3. From the full conditional density for θ2i and our square completion we get:
θ2i ∼ N(θ2i, V −1θ2i ) (2.14)
where


















σ22 − σ12σ−111 σ12
(2.16)
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4. The full conditional density for µit is:




× ϕ (µit ; Xitβ + ρdit + δ(Dit −Witα− θ1i) + θ2i, σu)
(2.17)
In order to sample µit we utilize the independence chain Metropolis-Hasting algorithm which
uses a proposal density independent across draws. Geweke (1989) argued that the proposal
density should have tails at least as fat as the posterior. For that reason we select the t-
distribution with a small number of degrees of freedom as the candidate-generating density.
Following Chib et al. (1998), we tailor the proposal density to the target density centered
at its modal value
∧
µit = arg max lnπ (µit | yit,dit, Zi,∆i) . To obtain the mode we imple-
ment the Newton-Raphson algorithm using the gradient vector gµi and the Hessian Hµi of











is the negative inverse of the Hessian evaluated
at the mode, and v are degrees of freedom. The chain moves to a value µ†i drawn from the
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5. Let the prior distribution of α be N(α,H−1a ). The full conditional density of α is
α ∼ N(α,H−1a ) where










α = H−1a A (2.20)
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W ′it(µit −Xitβ − ρdit − θ2i)
]
(2.21)
6. We specify priors β ∼ N(β,H−1β ), ρ ∼ N(ρ,H
−1
ρ ), δ ∼ N(δ,H−1δ ) and let γ = [β
′ ρ δ]′ and
Cit = [Xit dit (Dit −Witα− θ1i)]
Then the full conditional density of γ is γ ∼ N(γ,Hγ
−1) where



















C ′it(µit − θ2i)
]
(2.23)




Jit = µit − [(Xitβ + ρdit + δDit −Witα− θ1i) + θ2i] (2.24)














8. Finally, given the Inverse Wishart prior Σ ∼W−1 (v, V ), the full conditional density of Σ is
Σ ∼W−1
(
N + v, θθ′ + V
)
(2.26)
2.4 Bayes factor and Treatment effects
To test the null hypothesis of no endogeneity of the treatment variable (H0 : δ = 0) we need to
compare the unrestricted model M1 and the restricted model M0 with δ = 0. For model comparison
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where π (y |Mi) is the marginal likelihood for model Mi. Since the models are nested we can apply
the Savage-Dickey ratio approach to calculate the Bayes factor (see Verdinelli and Wasserman,
1995). Suppose that θ = (ω, ψ) is the parameter set and we want to test the null hypothesis
ω = ω0. Dickey (1971) showed that if the prior for ψ in the restricted and unrestricted models is
the same at the point ω = ω0 then the Bayes factor can be calculated as
B01 =
π (ω0 | y)
π (ω0)
Therefore, under weak assumptions the Bayes factor is calculated as:
B01 =
π (δ∗ | y)
π (δ∗)
where π (δ∗ | y) is the posterior density and π (δ∗) the prior density evaluated at δ∗ = 0.
The prior for δ must be specified carefully. In Bayesian estimation the effect of priors diminishes
as the sample size becomes fairly large. However, as shown in Kass and Raftery (1995), Bayesian
testing differs from estimation in that the effect of the prior density may not vanish as the sample
size increases. As a result, the Bayes factor is sensitive to the choice of priors. Improper priors (that
can be used for estimation and prediction) will always choose the null hypothesis and therefore are
not acceptable for hypothesis testing. Even informative priors with a large spread on πi under
H1 may provide overwhelming support to the model with fewer parameters regardless of the data,
thereby favoring the restricted model. For that reason we choose informative priors.
In our application, we are interested in measuring the impact of the transition from the unin-
sured to the insured state on utilization of medical services. Let yIit denote the outcome with
treatment (insurance coverage) and yUit the outcome without treatment (lack of insurance) for indi-
vidual i in period t. The observed outcome can be written as a function of yIit and its counterfactual
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yUit
yit = dityIit + (1− dit)yUit (2.27)
since we can not observe the same individual in both states — insured and uninsured — at the
same time.
The treatment effect for the treated (TET), defined as the insured’s expected gain (in terms of
utilization) from having insurance coverage is given by:
E[yIit − yUit | dit = 1] = exp(Xitβ + ρ+ θ2i + δεit + uit)− exp(Xitβ + θ2i + δεit + uit) (2.28)
where t=1,...,T and individual i belongs to the treated group.
2.5 Numerical example
In this example we generate artificial data based on the proposed model to test our MCMC algo-
rithm. Specifically, we generate a balanced panel consisting of 4 periods and 3000 observations for
each period. The data are generated such that the binary treatment variable takes the value 1 in
about 90% of cases resembling our real data. In addition we generate a panel of 500 observations
for each of the 4 periods to compare estimates from different sample sizes. The following steps
illustrate the data generation process.
1. Generate: Xit = (1, xit), xit ∼ N (0, 1)
Wit = (1, wit), wit ∼ N (0, 1)
and specify: α = (2, 1) , β = (1, 1) , ρ = −0.5, δ = 0.5, σ11 = σ22 = 0.2, σ12 = 0.1 and
σu = 0.6















3. Generate εit ∼ N(0, 1) and
Dit = Witα+ θ1i + εit such that dit =
 1, if Dit ≥ 00, if Dit < 0 ,
4. Generate vit ∼ N(0, 1), uit = δεit +
√
σuvit and
µit = Xitβ + ρdit + θ2i + uit
5. Finally, generate yit such that yit ∼ Poisson (exp(µit))
We run our MCMC algorithm for 5,000 replications and we collect every 10th replication after
discarding the first 1000 replications of the burn-in phase. Table B.16 presents estimates of the
posterior means and standard deviations for the unrestricted models with 500 and 5000 observa-
tions. As the sample size increases the posterior means are moving closer to the true values and the
standard deviations become smaller. With 5000 observations the posterior means are very close to
the true parameters. The autocorrelation functions of the coefficients die off after 12 lags for all
parameters except from σ11 which dies off after 20 lags.
We also estimate the model ignoring the endogeneity of the treatment variable. To implement
this, in the estimation phase we fix the draws of δ to zero. Estimates of the posterior means and
standard deviations for the restricted (δ = 0) model are also presented in table B.1. The estimates
of β1 and ρ (0.40 and 0.14 respectively) are far from their true values 1 and -0.5. The inconsistency
of the treatment coefficient ρ reveals the problem of ignoring the endogeneity issue. While the
data have been generated such that the effect of treatment on outcome is negative, the estimated
posterior mean of ρ is found positive because it compounds the pure effect of treatment and selection
effects. The Bayes factor is found to be 1.35× 10−286 which provides decisive evidence against the
null hypothesis H0 : δ = 0.
6All tables of this chapter are placed in Appendix B.
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2.6 Application
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a national longitudinal survey of individuals over age 50
and their spouses. Its goal is to provide panel data to support research on retirement and health
insurance related issues. The survey provides information about demographics, income, assets,
health, cognition, family structure, health care utilization and costs, insurance, housing, job status,
and expectations. HRS is a not only rich but also extraordinarily complex. It consists of 4 cohorts
presented along with interview dates in table B.2.7 An initial HRS cohort including individuals
born between 1931 and 1941 was first interviewed in 1992 and subsequently every two years. The
second cohort (AHEAD) consists of individuals born in 1923 or before. They were first interviewed
in 1993 and subsequently in 1995, 1998, 2000, and 2002. In addition to respondents, the survey
interviewed the spouses (or partners) of married respondents regardless of age. Some spouses of
the initial HRS entry cohort respondents were age 70 or older and were subsequently included in
the AHEAD study as 1992 interviews. The HRS and AHEAD cohorts were merged, with a single
interview schedule, in 1998 and at the same time two new cohorts were added. The children of
depression (CODA) cohort are individuals born 1924 to 1930. Finally the war baby (WB) cohort
are those born 1942 to 1947. The last two cohorts were first interviewed in 1998 and subsequently
every two years.
We use the RAND HRS files - a user friendly version of a subset of the HRS - created by the
RAND center for the study of Aging. The RAND HRS data contain cleaned and processed variables
that are comparable across 6 survey waves. Wave 1 is from 1992. Wave 2 is from 1994 data for the
HRS cohort, and 1993 for the AHEAD cohort. Wave 3 is from 1996 data for the HRS cohort and
1995 for the AHEAD cohort. Waves 4, 5 , and 6 are from 1998, 2000, and 2002 respectively.
In our application we use only the initial HRS cohort of individuals born between 1931 and
1941 ignoring the AHEAD, CODA, and WB cohorts for two reasons. First, we want to avoid the
complexity of the ground rules for following baseline respondents and their spouses in subsequent
interview waves. Second, and most important, we want to construct a balanced panel. Furthermore,
we use 4 waves (waves 3-6) of the initial HRS cohort. The first 2 waves are excluded since none of
7Table B.2 is a modification of a table that appears in RAND HRS documentation, version E, August 2005.
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the individuals has reached the threshold of 65 years. In addition, the instructions accompanying
the question about respondents doctor utilization are significantly different in the first two waves.
The resulting panel consists of 5295 individuals present in all 4 waves, thereafter referred to as
periods 1-4.
Table B.3 gives definitions and summary statistics for the variables in each of the 4 waves. The
dependent variable DRVIS is defined as the number of times the respondent has seen or talked to
a medical doctor including emergency room or clinic visits in the reference period. The number of
doctor visits increases over time from 7.07 in the 1996 wave to 8.33 in the 2002 wave. The vector
of explanatory variables used in the mean equation includes the socioeconomic variables AGE,
GENDER, EDUCYR, BLACK, HISPANIC, MARRIED, the self-perceived health status variables
EXCHLTH, VGHLTH, GOODHLTH (FAIRPOORHLTH is the reference category), the economic
variables INC and WEALTH, the year dummies YEAR96, YEAR98, YEAR00 corresponding to
waves 1 to 3 (wave 4 is the reference category), and the binary variable INS indicating whether
individual has any insurance coverage. Since health status indicators are self perceived rather than
measured based on diagnoses coding (dcg scores) it is likely to leave part of health status variation
unexplained. The unexplained part included in the error terms of the insurance and mean equations
may be responsible for selection on unobservables which motivates the modeling strategy. Income
is the sum of all income in household (respondent’s and spouse’s earned income plus capital income
plus income from employer pension plus income from social security retirement plus income from
unemployment benefits and government transfers). Wealth is constructed as the net value of total
wealth excluding second residency. In order to avoid problems caused by extreme values, income
and wealth are transformed to the categorical variables INC and WEALTH as shown in table B.4.
The same explanatory variables with the addition of the exclusion restriction THRES indicating
whether an individual is over 65 or older are included in the insurance equation.
All U.S. citizens and legal residents 65 years of age and older who have an employment record (or
are married to someone with an employment record) that entitles them to Social Security benefits
are eligible for Medicare. This accounts for 95% of the elderly population. In addition, people with
disabilities who are younger than age 65 and who have received Social Security Disability Insurance
(SSDI) or Railroad Retirement disability payments for 24 months, people with end-stage renal
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disease (ESRD) requiring dialysis or a transplant, and people with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis
(ALS) are covered by Medicare. Figure E.1 8 graphs Medicare coverage by age for all individuals
in the sample (line with squares), whites with at least 12 years of education (line with stars) and
less educated blacks or Hispanics (line with circles). For all three groups there are discontinuous
changes in Medicare coverage at age 65 with less educated minorities having the largest Medicare
coverage rate just before the age of 65.
Medicare eligibility at age 65 is a powerful instrumental variable for insurance coverage. Figure
E.2 shows insurance coverage rate by age for the overall population and the two sub-groups of
educated whites and less educated blacks or Hispanics. Coverage rate for the overall population
represented by the line with squares rises at age 65 from 88% to 98%. The line with stars shows
that educated whites have higher coverage rate (93%) just before age 65 than the overall population
but the gap narrows once they become eligible for Medicare. The discrete jump in coverage rate at
age 65 for less educated minorities is notably larger. Only 68% are insured prior to age 65 while
93% have insurance coverage just after their 65th birthday.
Only 5% of individuals are 65 or older in period 1. The percentage of those crossed the Medicare
eligibility threshold increases to 20% in period 2, and reaches 57% in the last period. Accordingly
the number of insured rises over time from 89% in 1996 to 96% in 2002. Table B.5 shows utilization
by insurance status. The gap in doctor visits between insured and uninsured widens from 0.98
visits in period 1 to 3.60 in period 4. Table B.6 presents differences in utilization and insurance by
group. DOC is a binary variable that shows whether the individual had at least one doctor visit.
We estimate the model running the Markov chain for 5000 replications and discarding the
first 1000 replications of the burn-in phase. Table B.7 reports the posterior means and standard
deviations of the parameters. As expected, the health status variables EXCHLTH, VGHLTH, and
GOODHLTH have strong negative effects on the utilization decision compared to the reference
category which includes individuals in fair or poor health. However, their impact on insurance
is weak. Being female has a strong positive impact on the number of doctor visits. Blacks and
Hispanics are less likely to have insurance coverage. The opposite is true for married individuals
who also utilize more doctor visits. Education has strong positive effects on both insurance and
8All figures are placed in Appendix E.
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utilization. Individuals in households with higher income have a higher number of doctor visits but
it is household wealth that affects positively the decision to buy insurance.
The posterior means of the treatment parameter ρ and the correlation parameter δ, 0.328(0.044)
and -0.042(0.021) respectively, are strong. Unobserved factors that affect positively whether an
individual has insurance coverage have also a strong negative impact on the number of doctor
visits implying favorable selection bias. An interpretation could be that insured individuals are on
average unobservably healthier or less risky than if they were randomly assigned to the insured state
and therefore, they utilize fewer doctor visits on average. Since selection bias on both observables
and unobservables has been taken into account, the treatment parameter ρ can be seen as the pure
incentive effect of insurance on utilization. Ignoring self selectivity on unobservables would have
resulted in a misleadingly smaller estimate for the incentive effect since the treatment parameter
would compound selection and incentive effects.
We are interested in comparing the model that permits endogeneity of insurance and a model
that treats insurance as exogenous. The Bayes factor calculated by the Savage-Dickey ratio is
2.4× 10−6 which provides decisive evidence against the null hypothesis H0 : δ = 0.
Average treatment effects for the treated (ATET) are calculated for all four periods as explained
in section 4. They are reported in table B.8 as ATET1-ATET4 for periods 1-4 respectively. Insured
individuals in period 1 utilize 1.92 more doctor visits than if they had not been covered. Their
gain in utilization from the treatment (insurance) rises from 1.92 visits in period 1 to 2.04 visits in
period 2, 2.12 visits in period 3 and 2.27 doctor visits in period 4. Average treatment effects (ATE)
are presented in table B.9 and are slightly lower than the ATET for all waves. Compared to the
unconditional differences in utilization between the insured and the uninsured, average treatment
effects differ substantially in periods 1 and 4. The actual utilization difference in wave 1 is 0.98
visits, remarkably lower than the ATE (1.92 visits) and the ATET (1.88 visits). This gap implies
favorable selection bias. Incentive effects measured by ATE and ATET are positive and result in
utilization increase of approximately 2 doctor visits. However, due to favorable selection observed
differences in utilization are lower than those estimated by the treatment effects. The results are
reversed in wave 4. The difference in unconditional means of the insured and uninsured is 3.60
doctor visits while the ATE estimates a rise of only 2.23 doctor visits when individuals switch
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from the uninsured to the insured state. This difference can be explained by the existence of
adverse selection effects. In waves 2 and 3 actual differences in utilization and treatment effects
are relatively close. It is interesting that the size of the selection effect is large only in waves 1
and 4 and that the direction of selection bias is the opposite in the two waves. How can this be
explained by the data? Table B.10 presents the means of health variables by insurance status. In
wave 1 insured individuals have higher means of “excellent health” and “very good health” and
lower means of “good health” and “fair or poor health”. Since insured individuals are healthier
they utilize less doctor visits than the uninsured. Surprisingly, in wave 4 the mean of “excellent
health” is higher for the uninsured which may be the source of adverse selection. Therefore, after
removing adverse selection on observables and favorable selection on unobservables reflected in the
negative correlation coefficient δ, the remaining utilization difference of 2.23 doctor visits is the
incentive effect in wave 4.
At the theoretical level, universal coverage may reduce the use of the emergency department
by the previously uninsured and cause overcrowding of primary care physician offices. It would
therefore be more appropriate to estimate the effect of insurance on various measures of utilization
such as primary care physician visits, specialist visits, hospital admissions, and outpatient visits.
Unfortunately, HRS defines doctor visits as the number of times an individual has seen a medical
doctor including clinic and ER visits. Another limitation is that health insurance is heterogeneous in
the sense that Medicare provides different benefits than other insurance plans. Therefore, differences
in utilization may be observed because individuals covered by other forms of insurance switch to
Medicare at age 65 and not because uninsured individuals obtain coverage. Besides the limitations,
the application offers an example of the model’s ability to deal with endogenous treatment in panel
data applications with count dependent variables.
2.7 Conclusions
The chapter proposed a panel count data model with correlated random effects that accounts
for endogeneity of a binary choice variable. The model was applied to analyze the effect of health
insurance coverage on utilization of doctor visits allowing for potential endogeneity of the insurance
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status. The sample consists of individuals over age 50 and their spouses followed for 4 waves from
1996 t0 2002. The incentive effects of health insurance are separated from selection bias on both
observables and unobservables and are found to be positive and strong. Insured individuals utilize
1.92 more doctor visits in wave 1, 2.04 in wave 2, 2.12 in wave 3 and 2.27 in wave 4. Compared to the
observed utilization rates that compound incentive and selection effects, these numbers show a more
consistent pattern in utilization differences between insured and uninsured population. Depending
on data availability, the model can be used to estimate the impact of insurance coverage on other
measures of health care utilization such as specialist visits, hospital admissions and outpatient
services. Therefore, it adds an empirical tool in the current discussion on universal health insurance
coverage as it can predict overcrowding in primary care physician offices or shifting of services from
the costly emergency department to the outpatient setting.
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Chapter 3
Demand for Cigarettes: A Mixed
Binary-Ordered Probit Aproach
This chapter is a lightly revised version of a paper by the same name published in the journal
Applied Economics in 2008 by Panagiotis Kasteridis, Murat Munkin, and Steven Yen:
Kasteridis P., M. Munkin, and S. Yen, 2008. Demand for cigarettes: a mixed binary-ordered
probit approach. Applied Economics, in press. DOI: 10.1080/00036840701704402.
My use of ”we” in this chapter refers to my co-authors and myself. My primary contributions
to this paper include (1) most of the estimation, and (2) part of the writing.
3.1 Introduction
This paper proposes an approach to analyze the demand for cigarettes utilizing a rich dataset that
identifies non-smokers, potential smokers, quitters and actual smokers in the sample. This infor-
mation brings additional gains in efficiency than that accomplished in the double-hurdle approach
(e.g., Jones, 1989a) which has been the primary econometric tool in cigarette demand modeling.
Following a general approach suggested in Jones (1989a), the proposed model consists of an equa-
tion that explains the decision to be a non-smoker, an equation that explains the quitting decision
for those who started smoking in the past, and an equation that models the level (number) of
cigarettes consumed. Five competing specifications are considered for the level equation, some of
which have been attempted in the literature.
There is a long-standing interest in the empirical analysis of cigarette smoking by individuals
because the health effect of cigarette smoking is an important public-health issue. Many studies are
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based on micro survey data, which allow for investigation of the roles of detailed socio-demographic
characteristics. In modeling cigarette demand with microdata, it has become a standard approach
to assume that cigarette consumption is subject to two decisions: whether to smoke and how much
to smoke (Fry and Pashardes, 1994; Garcia and Labeaga, 1996; Jones, 1989a, 1989b, 1995; Labeaga,
1999; Mullahy, 1985). These models vary in specifications of the two censoring mechanisms. The
double-hurdle model, a bivariate generalization of the Tobit model (Tobin, 1958), assumes that
zero observations are attributed to both nonparticipation and censoring (e.g., Atkinson et al., 1984;
Jones, 1989a). Specifically, with two separate processes to govern participation and consumption
in the double-hurdle model, zero observations are generated by those who are non-smokers and
those who are potential smokers but choose not to consume. In many datasets potential smokers
are usually not identifiable. However, availability of such information can lead to efficiency gains
and simplifications of functional forms. Jones (1989a) introduces a trivariate model which features
three stochastic processes accommodating starting, quitting and the level of cigarette smoking. Not
only do we know individuals in our dataset who never smoked but also we can identify those who
started smoking in the past and quit. Those who identify themselves as non-smokers and quitters
have zero cigarette consumption. It is interesting to note that a few individuals among those who
are smokers choose not to smoke, perhaps, trying to quit smoking. All this information is utilized
in our approach.
Another important issue this paper addresses relates to the distribution of the level variable.
The number of cigarettes is a count variable. Many of the double-hurdle model applications have
been based on the bivariate normal distribution. While the normal distribution may be appropriate
for applications based on cigarette expenditure data (Atkinson et al., 1984; Jones and Labeaga,
2003) or weekly consumption data (Jones, 1989a), it is unlikely to accommodate other forms of
reported consumption. It is plausible to assume the Poisson or Negative Binomial distribution for
the count variable. However, a close examination of the dependent variable in our dataset shows
that the underlying distribution is neither normal nor Poisson related and it is difficult to expect
a good fit from such models. Since most of the observed consumption values are reported as a
fraction of a pack of cigarettes it is reasonable to group observations in categories and utilize the
ordered outcome approach. We consider two competing specifications along that line: the ordered
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probit and sequential probit models.
In this paper, we accommodate our particular form of data by following the trivariate model
of Jones (1989a) and trying alternative distributions for the level equation. Specifically, the model
features a starting equation, a quitting equation, and an equation that explains the level of con-
sumption with five alternative specifications. First we analyze a joint sample that includes both
male and female individuals. We find that the ordered probit model specification is preferred to
the others based on the Akaike information criterion (Akaike, 1973). To facilitate interpretations
of results we propose to calculate the marginal effects of variables for the preferred ordered probit
model. The calculated effect with respect to gender suggests that further analysis applied to the
male and female subsamples is desirable. We also check sensitivity of the calculated marginal effects
to alternative categorization of the level variable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model and presents five
competing specifications of the level equation. Section 3 describes the data and variables used in the
study. Section 4 considers an application and presents the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
The computational appendix presents the likelihood function for the fully-specified (dependent)
trivariate model and formulae for the marginal effects.
3.2 Econometric Specification
Assume we observe N independent observations where the dependent variable of interest, yi (i =
0, 1, ..., N), is a count variable that displays a large proportion of zeros. Each individual i belongs
to one of three groups. The first group includes individuals who had not started smoking by the
time the survey was conducted. The second group are those who had smoked in the past but
decided to quit and consider themselves quitters. The last group are current smokers. The binary
decisions to start and quit smoking are both modeled with probit models. The starting equation
is characterized by a latent equation
s∗i = Xiα1 + ε1i, (3.1)
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where latent variable s∗i measures the difference in utility derived by individual i from starting and
not starting smoking, Xi is a vector of exogenous variables, α1 is a conformable parameter vector,
and the error terms ε1i are independently and identically distributed as standard normal, that is,
ε1i ∼ N(0, 1). The observed binary variable for starting (Si) relates to the latent variable (s∗i ) such
that
Si =





taking a value of 1 if the individual ever started smoking. Then the probability of starting is
Pr(Si = 1) = Φ (Xiα1) , (3.3)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the standard normal. Likewise, quitting
is characterized by latent variable q∗i , which measures the difference in utility derived from smoking
and quitting states, and specified as
q∗i = Xiα2 + ε2i, (3.4)
where ε2i ∼ N(0, 1). The observed binary variable for quitting is defined as
Qi =





where Qi = 1 if a person continues smoking and Qi = 0 if she quits, and
Pr(Qi = 1) = Φ (Xiα2) . (3.6)
Let yi be our dependent variable, measuring the level of smoking. Variable yi takes the value of
zero for either non-smokers (Si = 0) or quitters (Qi = 0|Si = 1). Non-zero values can only be
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[1− Pr(Si = 1)]
∏
Si=1,Qi=0




Pr (Si = 1) Pr (Qi = 1|Si = 1) Pr (yi|Si = 1, Qi = 1) (3.7)
where θ is a vector containing all parameters in the model, and the products are taken over sample
observations satisfying (Si = 0) , (Si = 1, Qi = 0) and (Si = 1, Qi = 1) conditions respectively.
For the conditional density Pr(yi|Si = 1, Qi = 1), we consider five different specifications:
a Gaussian model that truncates the error term to ensure non-negativity, two negative binomial
models, an ordered probit and a sequential ordered probit model. The Gaussian specification which
is the driving mechanism in the double-hurdle model (Jones, 1989a), and the single-hurdle model
(Yen, 2005) assumes that yi follows a truncated normal distribution with mean Xiβ and variance
σ2 such that
yi = Xiβ + ui, (3.8)
ui > −Xiβ (3.9)
and




where φ(·) is the probability density function (pdf) of the standard normal.
We also consider two forms of the negative binomial model, namely NB1 and NB2, with prob-
ability mass functions of the forms





















where λi = exp(Xiβ), Γ(·) is the Gamma function, and υ is the overdispersion parameter.
Finally, we specify two ordered outcome models. Construction of the ordered dependent variable
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is discussed in section 3. Assume that the dependent variable yi, measuring the level of smoking
conditional on Si = 1 and Qi = 1, takes integer values from 0 to M . Our first ordered outcome
model specification assumes that yi follows the ordered probit model. The latent variable Zi which
measures the propensity to smoke at different levels is assumed to be linear in Xi through the
structural equation
Zi = Xiβ + ui, (3.13)
where the error term ui ∼ N(0, 1). Variable yi relates to Zi according to the observability condition
yi =

1 iff Zi ≤ τ1
2 iff τ1 < Zi ≤ τ2
3 iff τ2 < Zi ≤ τ3
.
M iff τM−1 < Zi
, (3.14)
where τ = (τ1, ..., τM−1) are threshold parameters and τ1 is restricted to zero for identification. To
complete the likelihood function specify
Pr(yi = m|Si = 1, Qi = 1) = Φ (τm −Xiβ)− Φ (τm−1 −Xiβ) , (3.15)
so that
Pr(yi|Si = 1, Qi = 1) =
M∏
m=1
[Pr(yi = m|Si = 1, Qi = 1)]dim , (3.16)
where dim is a binary indicator such that dim = 1 iff yi ∈ mth category and 0 otherwise.
Our last model specification choice is the sequential probit model which assumes that the
ordered variable yi can take the value m only after the levels 1, ...,m− 1 have been reached. Then
the conditional probability of reaching level m given the levels 1, ...,m− 1 have been reached is
Pr(yi = m | yi ≥ m,β, τ) = Φ (τm −Xiβ) , (3.17)
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where Xi is a vector of covariates, β is a parameter vector, τ = (τ1, ..., τM−1) are threshold param-
eters. Then, the unconditional probabilities are
Pr(yi = m|β, τ) = Φ(τm −Xiβ)
m−1∏
k=1
[1− Φ(τk −Xiβ)], m = 1, ...,M − 1. (3.18)
Pr(yi = M | β, τ) =
M−1∏
k=1
[1− Φ (τk −Xiβ)] , m = M (3.19)
To highlight a potential advantage of this model over the ordered probit model consider the la-
tent representation of the sequential probit model which assumes a latent variable structure that
generates the count outcome. Define latent variables
ξmi = Xiβ + umi, (3.20)
where umi ∼ N(0, 1). The latent variables ξmi represent propensities to continue to the next level.
Applied to the number of cigarettes smoked, level m can be reached only after an individual makes
it to level m − 1 and ξmi defines propensities to smoke additional cigarettes to move to the next









iff ξ1i ≤ τ1
iff ξ1i > τ1, ξ2i ≤ τ2
iff ξ1i > τ1, ξ2i > τ2, ξ3i ≤ τ3
.
iff ξ1i > τ1, ξ2i > τ2, ..., ξM−2,i > τM−2, ξM−1,i ≤ τM−1
iff ξ1i > τ1, ξ2i > τ2, ..., ξM−2,i > τM−2, ξM−1,i > τM−1
. (3.21)
Then
Pr(yi|Si = 1, Qi = 1) =
M−1∏
m=1
[Pr(yi = m | β, τ)]dim [Pr(yi = M | β, τ)]diM . (3.22)
As can be seen from Equation 21, the propensities to move to the next level are not ordered since
the threshold parameters do not follow the order condition similar to that of the ordered probit
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model. It is not clear a priori whether propensities to smoke more cigarettes increase with the
level of smoking but allowing for a flexible propensity structure seems to be justified. It remains
an empirical matter whether the sequential model would perform better than the ordered probit.
We restrict the error covariances across equations to be zeros. This is done because our data do
not provide variables that would affect one equation but not the others. This is a limitation to our
study. The assumption of independence cannot be tested and the fully-specified trivariate model
cannot be estimated. We however present its likelihood function for the ordered probit case which
can be used in future applications with more conducive datasets (see Appendix D). For the current
application with independent error terms, the likelihood function (Equation 7) suggests that the
starting equation can be estimated separately with the whole sample, the quitting equation with
the starter sample (S = 1), and the level equation with the smoker sample (S = 1, Q = 1).
3.3 Data and Variables
Data are compiled from the 1994–96 Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by Individuals (CSFII),
collected by the Agricultural Research Service of the US Department of Agriculture (2000) (see US
Dept Agr, 2000) A nationally representative survey, the CSFII 1994–96 were stratified, multistage
area probability samples targeting individuals of all ages. With an overall response rate of 76.1
percent, the three-year data initially included 20607 individuals of all ages, of whom 10721 age 12
or over were asked about lifestyle and cigarette smoking. We focus on individuals age 15 or over as
few of those age 12–14 reported smoking any cigarettes. After deleting observations with missing
values on important variables, a total of 9587 individuals (4923 men and 4664 women) remain for
analysis.
In the CSFII, each individual was asked (i) whether she/he had smoked 100 or more cigarettes in
the entire life, and if yes, (ii) whether she/he currently smoked at the time of the survey. Responses
to these questions allow identification of starters and quitters, respectively. In addition, among the
current smokers, each was asked the question: ‘On average, how many cigarettes do you smoke per
day?’ The reported number is used as the quantity variable.
The quantities of cigarettes smoked are reported in the form of ‘number per day’, which feature
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a pile-up of counts at 10 cigarettes (0.5 pack), 20 (1 pack), 30 and 40 cigarettes, and so forth. It is
unlikely that such pile-ups of counts can be adequately accommodated by the normal distribution.
The histogram of the number of cigarettes smoked by the smokers only (Figure E.3) has spikes at
5, 10, 15, 20, 30 cigarettes, which are self-reported consumption levels.
Since the number of cigarettes is self-reported and perhaps due to convenience of (or errors in)
reporting there are disproportionately larger shares of outcomes measured in packs of 0.25, 0.5,
0.75, 1 and 1.5. Self-reported measurement errors are likely present in the sample as individuals
might have rounded the number of cigarettes reported smoked to the closest integer in multiples
of 5, such as 5, 10 and 20. It seems therefore reasonable to categorize the reported quantities in
the following categories: 0–5 cigarettes, 6–10, 11–15, 16–20, 21–30, and over 31. The histogram of
the constructed quantity variable is presented in Figure E.4 for smokers in the sample. Another
interesting feature of the sample is that there are a few individuals who identified themselves as
smokers who never quit but whose cigarette consumption is zero.
The CSFII also includes detailed demographic information on each individual. Variables com-
monly used in the cigarette demand literature are included in the starting, quitting and consumption
equations (Blaylock and Blisard, 1992a, 1992b; Jones, 1989a, 1989b, 1994, 1995). The explanatory
variables are income, body mass, education and age, along with dummy variables indicating urban-
ization (city, suburban), region (Northeast, Midwest, South), years of survey (Year95, Year96), race
(Black), ethnicity (Hispanic), self-evaluated health, and whether the individual was a white-collar
worker, had been diagnosed with cancer, high blood pressure or heart problems. Also included
are lifestyle variables indicating whether the individuals had consumed alcohol in the past three
months, had exercised regularly (no exercise and intensively), or was on any special diet (see Ta-
ble 1). Price information is not available in the survey and so is included in the constant terms.
However, the regional, urbanization and year dummy variables are expected to capture some price
variations. In view of the literature in which socio-demographic variables are used as proxies for
missing prices such as wage rate (e.g., Wales and Woodland, 1980) and the fact that, due to the
insignificant role of transportation cost, cigarette prices are likely to be dominated by state level
taxes, our use of regional, urbanization and time dummy variables serves as a remedial measure
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for the omission of the price variable1. Use of these variables in the literature and in the current
study is elaborated in the empirical section below.
Of the final sample (N=9587), 4743 individuals (49.47%) ever started smoking, 2430 (25.35%)
had smoked in the past but had quit. Among the 2313 (24.12%) current smokers, the average
number of cigarettes is 18.64 per day. Detailed definitions and sample statistics for all variables by
gender and for the pooled sample are presented in Table C.1.2
3.4 Application and Results
The application section is organized as follows. First we concentrate our analysis on the pooled
sample including both males and females. We estimate five competing models and perform model
selection based on the Akakie Information Criterion (AIC). The preferred model is the ordered
probit for which we calculate marginal effects and partial changes. The estimated partial effect
with respect to gender invites further analysis with the separate male and female subsamples,
for which the ordered probit model is found to be the preferred model as well. As a robustness
check we calculate marginal effects for the ordered probit model for a different segmentation of the
observations, that is, with alternative definitions of the ordered dependent variable.
ML estimates of the starting and quitting equations for the pooled sample are presented in
Table C.2. These results are the same for all five competing models since the first two equations
are independent of the conditional part and therefore parameters from the three equations are
separable. The significant determinants of the starting variable at the 5% level of significance are
education (negative), age, Black (negative), Hispanic (negative), healthy (negative), white-collar
(negative), male, alcohol and no exercise. Quitting (Q = 0) is affected positively by the individual’s
income, body mass, education, age, the geographic variables city, Northeast and suburban, and the
variables white-collar and diet. On the other hand, alcohol consumption has a negative impact on
quitting. Blacks are less likely to quit smoking than others, while Hispanics and males are more
successful in quitting.
1State-level cigarette taxes would be a good proxy for price. However, for confidentiality reasons the CSFII
sampling units were not identifiable by state.
2All tables of this chapter are placed in Appendix C.
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The results of the starting equation should be interpreted as the effects of the covariates on the
decision to be a non-smoker, which is an up-to-date decision taken throughout the entire life up
to the point of the survey. Thus, all variables affecting level are included in the starting equation
because they affect the current choice to be a non-smoker. The same reasoning applies to the
current decision to be and remain a quitter for those who once started smoking.
We find that body mass does not affect the decision to be a non-smoker but individuals with a
higher body mass are more likely to quit smoking. This result is consistent with the findings of Jones
(1994, 1995) and Blaylock and Blisard (1992b). Education improves the individual’s cognitive skills
regarding the risks associated with smoking, thereby discouraging starting and motivating quitting.
Similar result was reported by Blaylock and Blisard (1992a). It is also in line with Hsieh (1998) who
reports that the probability of quitting smoking increases with years of formal education and Ault
et al. (2004) who find that those who attend high school have a higher probability of smoking and
a lower probability of quitting than others. As expected, consumption of alcohol, another addictive
good, decreases the probability of being a non-smoker and the probability of quitting. Individuals
who exercise only rarely have a smaller probability to be a non-smoker but the lack of exercise has
no effect on quitting.
Jones (1995) and Yen (2005) found that age has a negative impact on participation arguing that
most smokers start smoking as a teenager or young adult. We find that age is negatively correlated
with the non-smoking decision. However, older individuals are more likely to quit. Individuals who
are black are more likely to be non-smokers but less successful in quitting. The empirical literature
on the effects of self-perceived health status is mixed. We find that poor health is negatively related
to non-smoking. As to the role of gender, males are more prone to starting smoking but are more
successful in quitting.
Table C.3 presents ML results for the conditional portion of the five competing models outlined
above. For the NB1, NB2, ordered probit, and sequential ordered probit models, body mass index,
age, Midwest, South and sex are positive and significant while city, Black, ethnicity (Hispanic),
and white-collar are negative and significant. Note that education is not significant for any of the
competing models.
The ordered probit model fits the data the best according to the log-likelihood values and the
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respective AIC3. The threshold parameters τ2, ..., τ5 are all significant at the 1% level, justifying
the use of all six categories over combining some categories. It is known for the ordered probit
model that the signs of the coefficients may not relate directly to the directions of the effects of
variables on the probabilities of categories. In addition, it is useful to relate each category to the
quantity level it stands for. To accomplish this goal we calculate marginal effects of each variable
on the ordered probit probabilities
Pr(yi = m|Xi) = [Φ (τm −Xiβ)− Φ (τm−1 −Xiβ)] Φ(Xiα1)Φ(Xiα2), (3.23)




ym Pr(yi = m|Xi), (3.24)
where ym is the category mean for the mth category. Since the ordered model involves combining
observations into categories our results are likely to depend on how the categories are defined (an
issue investigated later) and how averaging takes place. To address this issue we also use category
medians and modes as weights in calculating the marginal effects but since they produce similar
results the corresponding marginal effects are not reported. The marginal effects on the conditional
mean (Equation 3.24) is the sum of the marginal effects on the probabilities (Equation 23), weighted
by the category means ym. The effects of each binary explanatory variable are derived by simulating
a finite change (i.e., from 0 to 1) in the variable, holding all other variables constant. Analytical
expressions for the marginal effects are enclosed in the appendix.
The marginal effects of explanatory variables are presented in Table C.4. It is interesting
to note that significance and signs of the marginal effects vary with categories and the weighted
average. Income has a negative and significant effect on the cigarette consumption level, with higher
income individuals smoking fewer cigarettes than others. The roles of income in cigarette smoking
are largely inconclusive in the literature. Blaylock and Blisard (1992a) find that cigarettes are
3Note that the ordered probit specification for conditional level can be extended to the multinomial probit (or
logit). The lack of variations among some of the explanatory variables however prevented this pursuit without
consolidating the ordered dependent variable.
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an inferior good. Tansel (1993) reports a low but positive income elasticity of demand, which is
consistent with the addictive nature of cigarettes, whilst Goel and Nelson (2005) find that income
does not affect smoking prevalence among adults.
Body mass, education and age all have significant and overall negative effects. Body mass and
age both have positive effects on the probability of consuming in the lowest (0–5) category and
negative effects on the probabilities of the higher categories, whereas education has negative effects
on the probabilities of all but the highest (> 30) categories. The persistently negative effects of
body mass, education and age translate into the significant and negative effects on the level of
cigarette consumption.
Also presented in Table C.4 are the discrete effects of binary explanatory variables. Positive
effects on level are seen in Midwest, South and male, which are due to the positive (negative)
effects of these variables on the probabilities of consuming in the higher (lower) categories. Thus,
men consume more cigarettes than women, and individuals residing in the Midwest and the South
consume more cigarettes than those residing in the West. Consumption of alcohol and lack of
exercise are also positive and significant. Opposite effects are seen in the other variables, which
include residing in the city or a suburban area (relative to rural area), residing in the Northeast,
being on a special diet and being Black, Hispanic, healthy and white-collar worker. Individuals with
these characteristics consume fewer cigarettes than others. Overall, the effects of most variables
on the probabilities and conditional level, though statistically significant, are fairly small. The
more notable effects of variables are seen in ethnicity, gender, race, job status, use of alcohol and
diet, and lack of exercise, with individuals of the Hispanic origin smoking 3.43 fewer cigarettes
(per day) than non-Hispanics, men smoking 1.58 more cigarettes than women, alcohol consumers
smoking 2.21 more cigarettes than non-consumers, and Blacks smoking 1.17 fewer cigarettes than
non-Blacks. The effects of other variables are all very small, with individuals 10 years older smoking
only 0.77 fewer cigarette than their younger counterparts, and with all other binary variables having
the effects of less than 1 cigarette per day on average.
The estimated marginal effects with respect to gender in the pooled men-women sample invite
further analysis for men and women separately. Such separate analysis can provide further insight
into gender differences in cigarette consumption. We perform a formal test to determine whether
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male and female samples can be pooled or should be used separately in modelling cigarette demand.
The results, reported in Table C.5, suggest the hypothesis of equal parameters between genders is
rejected for all competing models, favoring estimation of each model for men and women separately.
Table C.6 presents estimation results for men and women, using the preferred ordered probit
specification for the conditional level. White-collar men are more likely to be non-smokers and
more successful in quitting. In contrast, having a white-collar job has no effect on the starting
or quitting variables among women. This result for women contradicts the usual argument that
antismoking messages have the greatest effect on women in better jobs. Men on a special diet are
more likely to be non-smokers and they smoke fewer cigarettes on average; these effects of special
diet are not seen in women. Other differences between genders are observed in the effects of city,
Hispanic, healthy and alcohol on quitting, and the effects of age and Northeast on the level of
smoking. Table 6 presents the mean marginal effects and average partial changes. The signs and
significance of the effects are similar to those for the pooled sample. However, the marginal effects
of body mass and age on the level, as well as the discrete effects of city, suburban, Midwest, South,
no exercise, Hispanic, and white-collar are smaller for women than for men. Yen (2005) calculated
elasticities with respect to the same variables using hurdle models and found smaller effects for
women as well. On the other hand our marginal effects with respect to Black and healthy are
larger for women, whilst Yen documents the opposite. Unconditional on smoking, a black woman
smokes 1.41 fewer cigarettes than other women while a black man smokes 0.97 fewer cigarettes
than other men. In general, our marginal effects are smaller than the those reported by Yen for
both men and women.
Finally, we investigate sensitivity of the marginal effects to the choice of categories. Our original
categorization of quantity, labeled “Categorization 1” in Table C.7, was based on the assumption
that self-reported numbers of cigarettes smoked are rounded upward to the closest fraction of a
cigarette pack during reporting. Self-reported consumption levels may be subject to non-systematic
measurement errors. While our paper does not address the measurement errors per se, as a ro-
bustness check of the marginal effects we categorized quantity with an alternative set of cut-offs
(Categorization 2): 0–4 cigarettes, 5–9, 10–14, 15–19, 20–29, and over 30. The marginal effects
calculated at the conditional means based on this alternative categorization are presented in Table
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6. The results show that the calculated mean effects are similar between the two categorization
schemes.
3.5 Conclusions
We address the issue of zero observations in modeling cigarette smoking. Our dataset contains
information which allows investigation of three key elements of cigarette smoking: starting, quitting
and the level of consumption. Despite a lack of exclusion restrictions, a shortcoming, which prevents
estimation of the fully specified model with dependent covariances, the special feature of the data
allows us to construct a statistical model that accommodate skewness of distribution and pile-ups
of counts in the number of cigarettes smoked. We model starting and quitting as binary variables,
and use alternative specifications to accommodate the level of smoking. The ordered probit model
provides the best fit to the data. Unlike other ordered probit specifications based entirely on the
category information, the approach we follow allows a way to relate each category to the level
associated with the category, thereby allowing the calculation of marginal effects of variables on
the level of cigarettes smoked.
The empirical analysis was carried out separately for men and women, and we find strong evi-
dence of gender differences in cigarette consumption in terms of parameter estimates and marginal
effects of explanatory variables. Estimation of our preferred model, with the ordered probit spec-
ification for the conditional level of smoking, requires categorization of the quantity variable and
we find our results are robust to alternative categorizations of the variable. Although our data
do not allow estimation of the dependent trivariate model due to a lack of exclusion restrictions,
we present the likelihood function which can be used in future applications when the data become
available. Whilst we apply the statistical model to cigarette smoking, the model can be useful in
other applications, such as consumption of soft drink or vegetables which are likely to be reported
in cans or servings, in which dependent variable may be censored and may feature skewness in
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Table A.1: Numerical Example
Coefficient True Value Unrestricted Unrestricted ACF(2) ACF(5) Restricted
N=500 N=5000 N=5000
beta1 -0.25 -0.30 -0.25 0.54 0.05 0.04
(0.13) (0.05) (0.06)
beta2 1 0.95 1.06 0.37 -0.02 0.93
(0.09) (0.03) (0.06)
gamma1 1 1.36 1.06 0.49 0.09 1.42
(0.14) (0.05) (0.07)
gamma2 2 1.88 1.94 0.46 0.12 1.99
(0.07) (0.02) (0.05)
alpha1 0 0.01 0.05 0.06 -0.02 -0.02
(0.06) (0.02) (0.05)
alpha2 1 0.99 0.96 0.26 -0.01 1.01
(0.08) (0.03) (0.06)
pi1 -0.5 -0.35 -0.50 0.60 0.06
(0.16) (0.06)
rho1 0.5 0.26 0.46 0.57 0.03 -0.05
(0.21) (0.08) (0.09)
pi2 -0.5 -0.43 -0.46 0.42 0.01
(0.12) (0.04)
rho2 0.5 0.27 0.50 0.33 0.01 -0.04
(0.17) (0.06) (0.08)
sigma 0.5 0.54 0.53 0.30 -0.02 0.67
(0.08) (0.03) (0.05)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table A.2: Utilization by Insurance Status
Outpatient visits (85.07% zeroes)
MC FFS
Mean 0.406 0.415







≥ 5 1.61 1.64
72
Table A.3: Summary of the Data
Variable Definition Mean St. Dev.
OPPVIS Number of outpatient physician visits 0.19 1.36
FAMSIZE Family size 3 1.43
AGE Age in years (divided by 10) 4.41 1.06
EDUCYR Completed years of education 13.55 2.57
MARRIED Equals 1 if the person is married 0.74 0.43
FEMALE Equals 1 if the person is female 0.56 0.5
BLACK Equals 1 if the person is African American 0.1 0.31
HISPANIC Equals 1 if the person is hispanic 0.14 0.34
NOREAST Equals 1 if the person lives in Northeastern US 0.18 0.39
MIDWEST Equals 1 if the person lives in Midwest US 0.24 0.43
SOUTH Equals 1 if the person lives in South US 0.36 0.48
MSA Equals 1 if the person is found in a metropolitan area 0.8 0.4
VEGOOD Equals1 if self perceived health is very good 0.36 0.48
GOOD Equals1 if self perceived health is good 0.28 0.45
FAIRPOOR Equals1 if self perceived health is fair or poor 0.1 0.3
NUMCHRON number of chronic conditions 0.82 1.37
NUMINJ number of injuries 0.26 0.66
INCOME income in $1000 34.9 28.25
MANAGED Equals 1 if the person is covered by an HMO or a PPO plan 0.36 0.48
SPOUAGE Spouse’s age (divided by 10) 2.75 2.39
SPOUPRIV Equals 1if spouse had private insurance last year 0.58 0.49
YEAR DUMMIES dummies for 98, 99, 00, 01, 02
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Table A.4: MCMC Estimates
Variable Hurdle Mean Insurance Variable Hurdle Mean Insurance
CONST -1.043 -0.301 0.001 VEGOOD 0.067 0.194 0.026
(2.267) (2.277) (2.238) (0.036) (0.084) (0.024)
FAMSIZE -0.041 0.006 0.007 GOOD 0.162 0.350 0.055
(0.013) (0.024) (0.009) (0.039) (0.08) (0.027)
AGE -0.016 0.065 -0.125 FAIRPOOR 0.381 0.552 0.105
(0.014) (0.221) (0.118) (0.058) (0.102) (0.046)
AGE2 0.019 -0.005 0.008 NUMCHRON 0.160 0.091 -0.001
(0.014) (0.025) (0.013) (0.016) (0.019) (0.009)
EDUCYR 0.011 0.028 -0.008 NUMINJ 0.195 0.063 -0.003
(0.006) (0.012) (0.004) (0.023) (0.026) (0.016)
MARRIED -1.524 -0.355 0.032 INCOME 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(2.224) (2.273) (2.226) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
FEMALE 0.412 -0.039 0.037 SPOUAGE 0.214
(0.036) (0.055) (0.002) (0.010)
BLACK -0.376 0.049 0.168 SPOUAGE2 -0.026
(0.080) (0.118) (0.036) (0.011)
HISPANIC -0.218 -0.099 0.151 SPOUPRIV(-1) 0.090
(0.063) (0.096) (0.032) (0.033)
NOREAST 0.359 0.092 0.023 π1 -0.586
(0.050) (0.093) (0.032) (0.354)
MIDWEST 0.542 0.116 -0.400 ρ1 0.894
(0.125) (0.095) (0.029) (0.555)
SOUTH 0.259 -0.110 -0.264 π2 0.022
(0.083) (0.090) (0.028) (0.155)
MSA -0.310 -0.077 0.502 ρ2 0.015
(0.127) (0.080) (0.024) (0.253)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table A.5: Average Treatment Effects for the Treated
excellent very good good fair or poor
mean 0.064 0.086 0.116 0.187
st. dev. 0.040 0.059 0.073 0.112
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Table B.1: Numerical example
Parameter True value Unrestricted Unrestricted Restricted
(N=500) (N=5000) (N=5000)
α1 2 2.16 2.01 2.07
(0.13) (0.04) (0.05)
α2 1 1.09 1.02 1.03
(0.09) (0.03) (0.03)
β1 1 1.10 1.00 0.40
(0.18) (0.08) (0.05)
β2 1 1.01 1.01 1.01
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
ρ -0.5 -0.57 -0.49 0.14
(0.19) (0.08) (0.05)
δ 0.5 0.56 0.52
(0.11) (0.05)
σ11 0.2 0.44 0.22 0.28
(0.13) (0.04) (0.04)
σ22 0.2 0.19 0.22 0.19
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
σ12 0.1 0.15 0.09 0.12
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
σu 0.6 0.61 0.59 0.82
(0.11) (0.05) (0.02)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table B.2: Source of data for entry cohorts in RAND HRS data file by wave.
Wave Entry Cohort
HRS (1931-1941) AHEAD ( -1923) CODA (1924-1930) WB (1942-1947)
1 1992 1992 N/A N/A
(HRS/AHEAD overlaps only)
2 1994 1993 N/A N/A
3 1996 1995 N/A N/A
4 1998 1998 1998 1998
5 2000 2000 2000 2000
6 2002 2002 2002 2002
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Table B.3: Summary statistics.
Variable Definition Mean (St. Dev.)
1996 1998 2000 2002
DRVIS Number of doctor visits 7.07 (8.39) 7.40 (8.66) 7.77 (8.61) 8.33 (9.18)
AGE Age in years (divided by 10) 5.94 (0.32) 6.12 (0.32) 6.32 (0.32) 6.53 (0.32)
EDUCYR Completed years of education 12.33 (3.11) 12.33 (3.11) 12.33 (3.11) 12.33 (3.11)
GENDER =1 if person is male 0.45 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50)
BLACK =1 if race is Black 0.14 (0.35) 0.14 (0.35) 0.14 (0.35) 0.14 (0.35)
HISPANIC =1 if person is Hispanic 0.08 (0.28) 0.08 (0.28) 0.08 (0.28) 0.08 (0.28)
MARRIED =1 if person is married 0.74 (0.44) 0.72 (0.45) 0.71 (0.46) 0.69 (0.46)
EXCHLTH =1 if in excellent health 0.20 (0.40) 0.14 (0.34) 0.14 (0.35) 0.13 (0.33)
VGHLTH =1 if in very good health 0.34 (0.47) 0.30 (0.46) 0.33 (0.47) 0.32 (0.47)
GOODHLTH =1 if in good health 0.28 (0.45) 0.33 (0.47) 0.32 (0.46) 0.33 (0.47)
INC Household income (categorical) 1.21 (0.71) 1.21 (0.71) 1.21 (0.76) 1.19 (0.74)
WEALTH Total household wealth (categorical) 4.13 (1.72) 4.21 (1.77) 4.35 (1.83) 4.41 (1.85)
INS =1 if individual has any insurance coverage 0.89 (0.32) 0.90 (0.30) 0.93 (0.25) 0.96 (0.21)
THRES =1 if age≥ 65 0.05 (0.21) 0.20 (0.40) 0.37 (0.48) 0.57 (0.50)
Table B.4: Categorical income and wealth.
Household income Categorical income (INC) Total household wealth Categorical wealth (WEALTH)
< $10,000 1 < $0 1
[$10,000, $20,000) 2 [$0, $300) 2
[$20,000, $30,000) 3 [$300, $1000) 3
[$30,000, $40,000) 4 [$1000, $2000) 4
[$40,000, $50,000) 5 [$2000, $3000) 5
[$50,000, $60,000) 6 [$3000, $5000) 6








Table B.5: Utilization of Dr visits by insurance.
PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4
INS UNINS INS UNINS INS UNINS INS UNINS
Mean 7.19 6.21 7.62 5.35 7.90 6.01 8.49 4.89
St. Dev. 8.27 9.22 8.70 8.02 8.58 8.86 9.23 7.17
% of zeroes 7.10 21.75 7.11 21.37 5.96 22.10 6.07 24.79
77
Table B.6: Differences in utilization and insurance by group.
OBS DRVIS DOC INS
Population 21180 7.64 0.92 0.92
(8.73) (0.27) (0.27)
Population≥ 65 6272 8.17 0.93 0.99
(8.95) (0.25) (0.09)
Population< 65 14908 7.42 0.92 0.89
(8.62) (0.27) (0.31)
Educated white 13596 7.31 0.93 0.95
(8.11) (0.25) (0.21)
Educated white≥ 65 3983 8.00 0.95 0.996
(8.46) (0.23) (0.06)
Educated white< 65 9613 7.03 0.93 0.94
(7.94) (0.25) (0.25)
Minorities 2256 8.33 0.88 0.76
(10.02) (0.33) (0.42)
Minorities≥ 65 686 8.86 0.88 0.96
(10.54) (0.33) (0.19)
Minorities< 65 1570 8.11 0.88 0.68
(9.78) (0.33) (0.47)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table B.8: Average treatment effects for the treated.
ATET1 ATET2 ATET3 ATET4
1.92 2.04 2.12 2.27
(2.06) (2.19) (2.17) (2.33)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table B.9: Average treatment effects.
ATE1 ATE2 ATE3 ATE4
1.88 1.98 2.07 2.23
(2.08) (2.18) (2.16) (2.31)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table B.10: Health variables by insurance status.
Mean PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4
INS UNINS INS UNINS INS UNINS INS UNINS
Excellent health 0.21 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.16
Very good health 0.35 0.26 0.31 0.22 0.34 0.25 0.32 0.25
Good health 0.28 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.34
Fair or poor health 0.16 0.29 0.37 0.20 0.32 22.10 0.23 0.25
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Table C.1: Summary statistics
Mean
Variable Definition Pooled Male Female
(N=9587) (N=4923) (N=4664)
Cigarettes Number per day (full sample) 4.50 (9.98) 5.19 (11.04) 3.76 (8.68)
Number per day (consuming sample) 18.64 (12.23) 20.29 (13.03) 16.66 (10.89)
Proportion of smokers 24.12% 25.59% 22.58%
Proportion ever started smoking 49.47% 56.65% 41.90%
Proportion quitters 25.35% 31.06% 19.32%
Income Per capita income in thousand USD 15.29 (12.54) 15.84 (13.02) 14.70 (11.98)
Body mass Quetelet’s body mass indexa 26.06 (5.25) 26.26 (4.55) 25.84 (5.90)
Education Years of formal education 12.50 (3.09) 12.56 (3.18) 12.43 (2.99)
Age Age in years 47.19 (18.95) 47.42 (18.97) 46.95 (18.93)
Dummy variables (yes = 1, no = 0)
Male Gender is male 0.51
City Resides in central city 0.29 0.28 0.31
Suburban Resides in suburban area 0.45 0.46 0.43
Rural Resides in rural area (reference) 0.26 0.26 0.26
Northeast Resides in the North or Northeast 0.18 0.18 0.18
Midwest Resides in the Midwest 0.24 0.24 0.25
South Resides in the South 0.37 0.36 0.37
West Resides in the West (reference) 0.21 0.22 0.20
Black Race is Black 0.12 0.10 0.13
Hispanic of Hispanic origin 0.04 0.04 0.04
Healthy Self-evaluated health is fair or better 0.83 0.84 0.82
White-collar A white-collar worker 0.23 0.25 0.21
Cancer Has been diagnosed of cancer 0.06 0.06 0.06
BP-heart Has had blood pressure/heart problems 0.27 0.28 0.27
Alcohol Consumed alcohol in past 3 months 0.62 0.67 0.56
Intensive exercise Exercises 2–4 times per week or more 0.50 0.57 0.42
Moderate exercise Exercises 1–4 times per month (reference) 0.12 0.12 0.14
No exercise Exercises rarely or never 0.38 0.31 0.44
Diet On a special diet 0.17 0.14 0.20
Year94 Survey conducted in 1994 (reference) 0.33 0.33 0.34
Year95 Survey conducted in 1995 0.34 0.34 0.34
Year96 Survey conducted in 1996 0.33 0.33 0.32
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. aQuetelet’s body mass index=(weight in kg)/(height in metres).
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Intensive exercise -0.028 -0.074
(0.042) (0.066)








Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
a,b Denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively.
c We label the second column as ”not quitting” to be consistent
with definition of the quitting equation in the text (Equation 5).
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Table C.3: ML estimates for conditional part: pooled sample
Level
(N=2313)
Variable Gaussian NB1 NB2 OP SOP
Constant 0.322 2.476a 2.384a 0.648a 0.683a
(3.247) (0.123) (0.125) (0.208) (0.161)
Income 0.058 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.040) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Body mass 0.343a 0.011a 0.013a 0.018a 0.014a
(0.082) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Education -0.214 -0.005 -0.003 -0.014 -0.011
(0.170) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007)
Age 0.088a 0.002a 0.004a 0.004a 0.004a
(0.029) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
City -4.419a -0.125a -0.134a -0.233a -0.182a
(1.095) (0.036) (0.035) (0.060) (0.045)
Suburban -1.377 -0.024 -0.027 -0.042 -0.030
(0.934) (0.032) (0.031) (0.055) (0.041)
Northeast -1.602 -0.017 -0.066 -0.083 -0.098
(1.485) (0.050) (0.048) (0.078) (0.060)
Midwest 3.788a 0.174a 0.129a 0.261a 0.152a
(1.272) (0.044) (0.041) (0.068) (0.050)
South 4.586a 0.208a 0.152a 0.331a 0.218a
(1.162) (0.041) (0.038) (0.064) (0.048)
Black -12.677a -0.366a -0.415a -0.652a -0.526a
(1.445) (0.041) (0.043) (0.068) (0.057)
Hispanic -20.782a -0.635a -0.707a -1.140a -0.909a
(4.247) (0.100) (0.122) (0.170) (0.163)
Healthy -1.290 0.001 -0.040 -0.059 -0.070
(1.048) (0.037) (0.035) (0.063) (0.047)
White-collar -3.051a -0.098a -0.101a -0.165a -0.117a
(1.137) (0.038) (0.038) (0.063) (0.047)
Cancer 0.316 0.021 0.004 -0.025 -0.027
(1.780) (0.054) (0.060) (0.095) (0.072)
BP-heart -0.703 -0.038 -0.019 -0.055 -0.029
(1.012) (0.036) (0.034) (0.060) (0.045)
Male 6.337a 0.182a 0.219a 0.345a 0.278a
(0.830) (0.027) (0.027) (0.046) (0.035)
Alcohol -0.337 -0.027 -0.020 -0.044 -0.021
(0.886) (0.030) (0.031) (0.052) (0.041)
Intensive exercise -2.096 -0.039 -0.049 -0.095 -0.022
(1.317) (0.047) (0.044) (0.074) (0.055)
No exercise 1.594 0.094a 0.058 0.108 0.110a
(1.329) (0.047) (0.044) (0.075) (0.056)
Diet -1.760 -0.070 -0.068 -0.101 -0.059
(1.303) (0.046) (0.043) (0.073) (0.055)
Year95 0.211 0.017 0.016 -0.030 -0.014
(0.887) (0.032) (0.031) (0.054) (0.041)
Year96 -0.681 -0.017 -0.009 -0.055 -0.044



















Log-likelihoode -17600.97 -17621.43 -17632.10 -12712.14 -39458.79
AIC 3.686 3.691 3.693 2.667 8.247
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
a,b Denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively.
dOP and SOP stand for Ordered Probit and Sequential Ordered Probit respectively.
eThe log-likelihood values and AIC reported at the bottom of each model
correspond to the trivariate models.
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Table C.4: Mean marginal effects and average discrete changes: pooled sample
Probabilities
Variable Mean m = 1 m = 2 m = 3 m = 4 m = 5 m = 6
Marginal effects of continuous variables
Income -0.033a 0.00030 -0.00023a -0.00010a -0.00025a -0.00005 -0.00054
(0.018) (0.00044) (0.00010) (0.00004) (0.00012) (0.00007) (0.00046)
Body mass -0.209a 0.00278a -0.00131a -0.00055a -0.00110a -0.00011 -0.00399a
(0.036) (0.00085) (0.00021) (0.00009) (0.00027) (0.00014) (0.00088)
Education -0.208a -0.00507a -0.00269a -0.00159a -0.00564a -0.00230a 0.00077
(0.080) (0.00189) (0.00046) (0.00021) (0.00058) (0.00031) (0.00196)
Age -0.077a 0.00057b -0.00051a -0.00025a -0.00070a -0.00021a -0.00117a
(0.014) (0.00032) (0.00007) (0.00004) (0.00009) (0.00005) (0.00035)
Average effects of discrete variables
City -1.094a 0.00759a 0.00114 -0.00171 -0.01448a -0.00900a -0.01286a
(0.250) (0.00356) (0.00271) (0.00120) (0.00387) (0.00200) (0.00278)
Suburban -0.826a -0.00312 -0.00577a -0.00355a -0.01319a -0.00563a -0.00669a
(0.240) (0.00315) (0.00258) (0.00114) (0.00352) (0.00186) (0.00288)
Northeast -0.841a -0.00086 -0.00426 0.00310a -0.01303a -0.00604a -0.00746a
(0.294) (0.00402) (0.00322) (0.00143) (0.00457) (0.00225) (0.00317)
Midwest 0.552b -0.01242a -0.00871a -0.00242b 0.00224 0.00551a 0.01157a
(0.311) (0.00318) (0.00294) (0.00137) (0.00439) (0.00232) (0.00380)
South 0.822a -0.01562a -0.01002a -0.00239b 0.00535 0.00792a 0.01528a
(0.285) (0.00327) (0.00278) (0.00126) (0.00406) (0.00222) (0.00349)
Black -1.166a 0.04418a 0.02072a 0.00342a -0.01394a -0.01358a -0.02010a
(0.246) (0.00649) (0.00370) (0.00151) (0.00468) (0.00201) (0.00206)
Hispanic -3.425a 0.02796a -0.01457a -0.01430a -0.06060a -0.02591a -0.02823a
(0.249) (0.01106) (0.00480) (0.00226) (0.00555) (0.00199) (0.00179)
Healthy -1.227a -0.00600 -0.00947a -0.00555a -0.01983a -0.00821a -0.00954a
(0.317) (0.00387) (0.00320) (0.00133) (0.00439) (0.00256) (0.00399)
White-collar -1.031a 0.00224 -0.00270 -0.00290a -0.01493a -0.00782a -0.01040a
(0.236) (0.00348) (0.00262) (0.00113) (0.00363) (0.00189) (0.00265)
Cancer -0.052 0.00192 0.00101 0.00020 -0.00052 -0.00061 -0.00096
(0.429) (0.00572) (0.00462) (0.00202) (0.00637) (0.00326) (0.00497)
BP-heart -0.365 0.00091 -0.00081 -0.00095 -0.00514 -0.00277 -0.00381
(0.248) (0.00353) (0.00268) (0.00112) (0.00359) (0.00196) (0.00300)
Male 1.579a -0.00990a -0.00176 0.00221a 0.02001a 0.01288a 0.01908a
(0.197) (0.00257) (0.00217) (0.00095) (0.00304) (0.00164) (0.00240)
Alcohol 2.216a 0.02148a 0.02586a 0.01332a 0.04003a 0.01349a 0.01251a
(0.200) (0.00250) (0.00228) (0.00127) (0.00319) (0.00165) (0.00241)
Intensive exercise -0.533b 0.00207 -0.00045 -0.00110 -0.00710 -0.00416b -0.00599
(0.322) (0.00425) (0.00351) (0.00155) (0.00485) (0.00248) (0.00373)
No exercise 1.126a 0.00111 0.00517 0.00385a 0.01669a 0.00809a 0.01054a
(0.371) (0.00442) (0.00378) (0.00176) (0.00547) (0.00284) (0.00429)
Diet -1.114a -0.00194 -0.00631a -0.00434a -0.01747a -0.00788a -0.00959a
(0.262) (0.00376) (0.00277) (0.00118) (0.00387) (0.00211) (0.00305)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.











































































































































































































































































































































Table C.6: ML estimation of the ordered probit parts for male and female
subsamples
Male Female
Starting Not quitting Level Starting Not quitting Level
Variable (N=4923) (N=2789) (N=1260) (N=4664) (N=1954) (N=1053)
Constant -0.334b 3.238a 0.518b -0.529a 3.054a 0.560b
(0.173) (0.269) (0.302) (0.158) (0.280) (0.304)
Income -0.001 -0.004a 0.002 (0.002) -0.007a 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Body mass 0.005 -0.032a 0.019a 0.003 -0.026a 0.023a
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007)
Education -0.042a -0.055a -0.013 -0.017a -0.083a -0.002
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.015)
Age 0.019a -0.032a 0.007a 0.005a -0.021a 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
City -0.061 -0.101 -0.261a 0.049 -0.252a -0.155b
(0.053) (0.073) (0.081) (0.053) (0.085) (0.089)
Suburban -0.074 -0.132a -0.042 -0.012 -0.263a 0.020
(0.047) (0.064) (0.076) (0.049) (0.077) (0.082)
Northeast -0.010 -0.149b 0.043 0.0004 -0.285a -0.247a
(0.062) (0.084) (0.105) (0.063) (0.097) (0.116)
Midwest -0.003 -0.019 0.298a 0.001 0.025 0.253a
(0.057) (0.079) (0.094) (0.059) (0.091) (0.099)
South 0.017 -0.020 0.380a -0.045 0.081 0.328a
(0.052) (0.075) (0.087) (0.055) (0.087) (0.094)
Black -0.117b 0.316a -0.594a -0.146a 0.236a -0.773a
(0.065) (0.090) (0.089) (0.062) (0.103) (0.111)
Hispanic -0.298a -0.394a -1.154a -0.713a -0.113 -1.101a
(0.100) (0.162) (0.205) (0.125) (0.248) (0.291)
Healthy -0.183a -0.150a 0.076 -0.271a -0.025 -0.122
(0.058) (0.070) (0.090) (0.055) (0.078) (0.088)
White-collar -0.131a -0.207a -0.139b -0.082 0.065 -0.269a
(0.050) (0.072) (0.084) (0.053) (0.083) (0.095)
Cancer -0.104 -0.152 -0.055 0.212a -0.055 -0.017
(0.088) (0.108) (0.155) (0.082) (0.109) (0.123)
BP-heart 0.033 -0.064 -0.039 -0.079 -0.009 -0.064
(0.050) (0.063) (0.083) (0.051) (0.075) (0.089)
Alcohol 0.493a 0.202a -0.074 0.610a 0.076 0.006
(0.043) (0.062) (0.075) (0.043) (0.071) (0.075)
Intensive exercise -0.014 -0.042 -0.055 -0.00001 -0.140 -0.146
(0.059) (0.091) (0.105) (0.059) (0.098) (0.107)
No exercise 0.098 0.134 0.130 0.223a 0.050 0.117
(0.066) (0.095) (0.112) (0.061) (0.099) (0.103)
Diet -0.129a -0.372a -0.239a 0.033 -0.155a -0.024
(0.057) (0.078) (0.120) (0.050) (0.077) (0.094)
Year95 -0.115a 0.107b -0.006 0.055 0.121b -0.022
(0.047) (0.063) (0.073) (0.046) (0.073) (0.082)
Year96 -0.059 0.035 -0.069 0.057 0.120 0.032











Starting Not quitting Level Starting Not quitting Level





Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
a,b Denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively.
cWe report log-likelihood values and AIC for the trivariate models.
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Table C.7: Mean marginal effects and average discrete changes
Categorization 1 Categorization 2
Male Female Pooled Male Female
Mean Marginal Effects
Income -0.031 -0.033 -0.029b -0.029 -0.035b
(0.024) (0.024) (0.016) (0.024) (0.021)
Body mass -0.247a -0.211a -0.197a -0.228a -0.179a
(0.056) (0.049) (0.034) (0.054) (0.046)
Education -0.254a -0.244b -0.251a -0.319a -0.199a
(0.107) (0.130) (0.068) (0.095) (0.093)
Age -0.110a -0.052a -0.076a -0.101a -0.047a
(0.021) (0.019) (0.013) (0.019) (0.015)
Average discrete changes
City -1.267a -0.744a -0.946a -1.113a -0.690a
(0.383) (0.295) (0.242) (0.374) (0.293)
Suburban -0.862a -0.620a -0.811a -0.841a -0.634a
(0.359) (0.280) (0.241) (0.335) (0.290)
Northeast -0.524 -1.108a -0.714a -0.324 -0.954a
(0.450) (0.338) (0.290) (0.461) (0.346)
Midwest 0.752b 0.596 0.659a 0.859b 0.675b
(0.450) (0.383) (0.301) (0.477) (0.380)
South 1.007a 0.750a 0.913a 1.121a 0.777a
(0.434) (0.368) (0.279) (0.421) (0.356)
Black -0.971a -1.407a -1.215a -1.060a -1.485a
(0.386) (0.277) (0.242) (0.415) (0.281)
Hispanic -3.839a -3.006a -3.462a -3.805a -3.097a
(0.401) (0.312) (0.242) (0.386) (0.287)
Healthy -0.974a -1.264a -1.147a -0.975a -1.281a
(0.453) (0.376) (0.296) (0.430) (0.371)
White-collar -1.557a -0.630a -1.035a -1.494a -0.651a
(0.359) (0.297) (0.227) (0.355) (0.293)
Cancer -1.012b 0.492 -0.060 -0.950 0.474
(0.543) (0.490) (0.406) (0.598) (0.496)
BP-heart -0.239 -0.417 -0.330 -0.281 -0.298
(0.370) (0.300) (0.239) (0.360) (0.302)
Alcohol 2.232a 2.177a 2.237a 2.248a 2.212a
(0.307) (0.258) (0.191) (0.283) (0.259)
Intensive exercise -0.377 -0.650b -0.523b -0.315 -0.653b
(0.471) (0.360) (0.317) (0.491) (0.372)
No exercise 1.196a 1.091a 1.141a 1.261a 1.085a
(0.552) (0.370) (0.335) (0.516) (0.376)
Diet -2.229a -0.307 -1.095a -2.228a -0.290
(0.379) (0.306) (0.241) (0.363) (0.304)
Male 1.527a
(0.189)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.




Likelihood Function of the Dependent Trivariate Model
The dependent trivariate model is not estimated due to data limitation but here we present the
likelihood function for the unrestricted (dependent) binary-binary-ordinal specification which can
be used in future applications when data allow. Assume the error terms of the starting, quitting




′ ∼ N(0, R), where
R =
 1 ρ21 ρ31ρ21 1 ρ32
ρ31 ρ32 1
 .
Denote θ as a vector containing all parameters in the model, Φk(...;B) as the k -variate standard
normal cdf (k = 2, 3) with correlation matrix (or scalar) B, and define diagonal matrix W =
diag[−1,−1, 1]. Also, for generality we use vectors X1i, X2i and X3i in the starting, quitting and














Φ3(X1iα1, X2iα2, τm −X3iβ;WRW ′)
−Φ3(X1iα1, X2iα2, τm−1 −X3iβ;WRW ′)
]}dim ,
where binary indicator dim is defined in the text (Equation 16). It can be verified that by restricting
all estimable correlation coefficients to zero, that is, ρ21 = ρ31 = ρ32 = 0, the likelihood function
above reduces to that for the independent model presented in the text (Equations (3.3), (3.6) and
(3.16)).
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Marginal Effects for the Trivariate Ordered Probit with Independence
Differentiating the conditional mean of the dependent variable (Equation 24) and averaging the
derivatives over the sample, the mean (average) marginal effect of the conditional mean with respect
































Note that for m = 0, yi is zero so that ym = 0.This simplifies our calculations since the term
ym Pr (yi = m | Xi) vanishes for m = 0. One can calculate the partial derivative with respect to
Xik as
∂ [Pr (yi = m | Si = 1, Qi = 1) Pr(Si = 1) Pr(Qi = 1)]
∂Xik
= Pr(yi = m|Xi)
×
[
βk[φ (τm−1 −Xiβ)− φ (τm −Xiβ)]









where Pr(yi = m|Xi) is defined in the text (Equation 23).
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Appendix E
Figures — Chapter 2
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Figure E.1: Medicare coverage by age
Figure E.2: Insurance coverage by age
94
Figure E.3: Histogram of cigarettes smoked
Figure E.4: Histogram of cigarette categories
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